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NAKED PRICE AND PHARMACEUTICAL TRADE SECRET 
OVERREACH 
 
Robin Feldman* & Charles Tait Graves† 
  
22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 61 (2020) 
 
Trade secret has drifted from a quiet backwater doctrine to a 
pervasive force in intellectual property. As always, the risk of 
distortion is great when a legal arena is developing and expanding 
rapidly. Nowhere do the theoretical tensions of trade secret law 
appear in such stark relief as in the modern pharmaceutical debates, 
where the heart of the theoretical question involves whether pricing 
is a proper subject for trade secrecy claims. 
 
We aim to bring trade secret into greater harmony with broad 
concepts that reach across all intellectual property regimes. As with 
other areas of intellectual property law, trade secret law is not a 
mere contest of private commercial interests. Rather, it embeds 
substantial dedication to the public interest, reflecting utilitarian 
balancing of key societal interests. In this context, we develop the 
concept of “thin” trade secret, looking to the analogous concepts in 
other intellectual property regimes. Such approaches embody the 
recognition that intellectual property rights are not solid monoliths, 
presenting an impenetrable wall through which no party but the 
rights holder may pass. Rather, they are brilliantly nimble and 
subtle systems, deftly threading their way among various societal 
goals. 
 
This Article offers the potential of anchoring trade secret more 
firmly to its theoretical base, as well as bringing trade secret closer 
to the family of other intellectual property regimes. Although 
squabbling, chaotic, and somewhat dispersed, all members of this 
time-honored family can learn from each other, sharing their battle-
worn wisdom with the newest, young upstart.      
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Deepa Varadarajan, and Rebecca Wexler for their comments on prior drafts. We 
also wish to thank Christopher Kim and Nick Massoni for their research 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The rising cost of prescription drugs in the United States presents a 
critical challenge in modern public policy. As prices rise sharply 
across all medications—from new, life-saving treatments for 
Hepatitis C1 and HIV2 to ordinary medications for more common 
ailments such as heart disease and diabetes3—personal and public 
budgets are straining to absorb the impact. New cancer treatments 
coming online at the million-dollar-per-patient mark4 only worsen 
the stress on the health care system. On the whole, these pricing 
trajectories threaten to roll back decades of improvement in access 
to health care for those at all income levels.5 
 
The problem is receiving growing attention from lawmakers, 
regulators, and the media.6 Absent from this flurry of attention, as 
well as from the bulk of the broader literature, is the role that certain 
intellectual property regimes are playing.7   
 
Specifically, to shield pricing arrangements in the pharmaceutical 
supply chain from scrutiny by regulators alone as well as from 
public scrutiny resulting from some forms of regulatory 
transparency, companies have turned to bold claims that prices, in 
and of themselves, are trade secrets and thus immune from 
regulatory disclosure. This Article challenges that notion to promote 
pricing transparency for the ultimate benefit of consumers.  To 
critique these industry claims on intellectual property grounds, we 
 
1 See Brandy Henry, Drug Pricing & Challenges to Hepatitis C Treatment Access, 
14 J. HEALTH BIOMED LAW 265, 266 (2018). 
2 See Shefali Luthra & Anna Gorman, Out-of-Pocket Costs Put HIV Prevention 
Drug Out of Reach for Many at Risk, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 3, 2018), 
https://khn.org/news/out-of-pocket-costs-put-hiv-prevention-drug-out-of-reach-
for-many-at-risk.  
3 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-03-
15-0080, INCREASES IN REIMBURSEMENT FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS IN PART D 
(2018) [hereinafter HHS INSPECTOR GENERAL]; see also CTR. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERV., DRUG SPENDING INFORMATION PRODUCTS FACT SHEET (2018); 
Ned Pagliarulo, To Shame Drugmakers, CMS Publicizes Price Hikes, 
BIOPHARMA DIVE (May 16, 2018), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/to-
shame-drugmakers-cms-publicizes-price-hikes/523693.  
4  See Jonathan D. Rockoff, The Million-Dollar Cancer Treatment: Who Will 
Pay?, WALL ST. J. (April 26, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-million-
dollar-cancer-treatment-no-one-knows-how-to-pay-for-1524740401.  
5  See ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, & SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE 
UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 9–10 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2019) (describing the impact of rising drug prices on those who have private 
insurance, public insurance, and the uninsured). 
6 See infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 106–122 (containing a literature review). 
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discuss the underdeveloped state of theory in trade secret law.  
Ultimately, we offer grounds for rejecting claims that “naked prices” 
in the pharmaceutical supply chain are trade secrets based on 
contemporary conceptions of trade secret—and we borrow from 
copyright law to advance a new concept of “thin” trade secret 
protection amenable to appropriate regulatory challenges. 
 
That companies have turned to trade secret claims as a weapon 
against state regulators comes as no surprise. Trade secret law 
encompasses the rules governing business information that, to 
receive protection, must be nonpublic, of competitive value, 
guarded with reasonably security measures, and not readily 
ascertainable. By all accounts, trade secret law is an increasingly 
important area of intellectual property law. This is so not only in 
civil litigation and in espionage-related trade secret indictments, but 
also in a surprising number of areas outside the traditional litigation 
context including public infrastructure, medical device data, and 
access to technologies used by the prosecution in ordinary criminal 
cases.8  As scholars have noted, trade secret has drifted from a quiet 
backwater doctrine to “the most pervasive form of intellectual 
property in the modern economy.” 9  The rise of trade secret in 
modern jurisprudence has been driven by a multitude of factors. In 
2016, President Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (the 
“Federal Act” or DTSA), a comprehensive law that, for the first time, 
provided a federal civil cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation. 10  Even before passage of the Federal Act, 
companies increasingly looked for shelter under the wings of state 
trade secret laws as Supreme Court decisions limited the protections 
available under patent law.11 More broadly, the rise in trade secret 
is fueled by the explosive growth in the technology sector—and in 
the everyday use and reliance in the workplace on scientific and 
 
8 See infra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
9  See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret 
Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017); see also Deepa Varadarajan, The Uses 
of IP Misuse, 68 EMORY L.J. 741, 783 (2019) (describing the modern rise of trade 
secret and quoting Menell). 
10  The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 was embedded into the existing 
Economic Espionage Act of 1995.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39. 
11  See generally David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapiznikow, 
Whitney E. McCollum & Jill Winder, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZAGA L. REV. 291 (2010); David S. 
Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapiznikow, Whitney E. McCollum & Jill 
Winder, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 
GONZAGA L. REV. 57 (2011); Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250 (2013). 
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technical information that is not public, but also may not be patented 
or copyrightable.12   
 
At the same time, uncertainty about the nature of trade secret law 
makes it an inviting area to exploit.  Trade secret law exists as both 
state law and federal law, and it also crops up in administrative 
disputes. In part because of this sprawl, legal theory in the trade 
secret arena does not always unfold in a coherent and consistent 
manner.13  
 
But as corporate claims of trade secret rights grow, there is a 
gathering chorus of criticism regarding the effect of such claims on 
the public interest.14 Just as trade secret law itself is not always 
uniform across jurisdictions and individual rulings, however, 
scholars and commentators do not always speak in the same voice 
when focusing on seemingly unrelated areas of trade secret disputes.  
To help bridge these gaps, we offer theories of trade secret law to 
critique secrecy assertions in the pharmaceutical pricing context, but 
that have wider and general application. 
 
Part of the problem is mundane—those working in different areas of 
law have yet to compare notes about these emerging issues, and to 
seek common ground to approach related public policy problems.  
But the problem is one of theory as well in this still-underdeveloped 
area.   Philosophical confusion over the nature of trade secret law—
as a property theory, based on whether a defined item of information 
qualifies as intellectual property, or as a relational theory, based on 
looser notions that someone agreed to hold broad areas of 
“confidential information” in trust, with less attention to whether 
information meets criteria for protection—creates theoretical 
uncertainty.  Choosing one starting point or the other can lead to 
 
12 See supra note 11.  
13 To be sure, the gradual adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) and 
the DTSA’s enactment in 2016 reflect significant gains in coherence.  As Sharon 
Sandeen has shown in her work on the drafting history of the UTSA, these 
statutory regimes offer a largely consistent framework – a marked improvement 
over prior common law regimes.  See Sharon Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade 
Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L.R. 493 (2010); see also Sharon 
Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade 
Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017) (noting that emerging DTSA 
case law tends to rely on existing UTSA case law).  However, trade secret law 
still has a long way to go. Patent law, for example, gained coherence only 
gradually through the adoption of patent-specific local court rules, the creation of 
Markman hearings and the Patent Trials and Appeal Board (PTAB), and 
important Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions on issues such as software 
patents and presumptions in requests for injunctive relief. 
14 See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. 
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substantially different, if inadvertent, real-world outcomes.  In this 
Article, we explore historical reasons for this divergence.  We also 
suggest that harmonizing the philosophical background of these 
debates and adopting a strong conception that trade secret rights 
must be established as specific, discrete items of property will best 
promote the public interest within the parameters of these now-
dominant statutory definitions of trade secret rights.  This move is 
not simply one of abstract theory, but one that would also change 
the manner in which these courtroom disputes have been litigated, 
and thus have a lasting and immediate impact on regulatory 
outcomes.   
 
We focus on industry assertions of trade secrecy deployed to resist 
consumer-friendly efforts by regulatory bodies to require 
transparency in drug pricing as the vehicle for this analysis.  
Nowhere do the theoretical tensions of trade secret law appear in 
such stark relief as in the modern pharmaceutical debates.  In these 
battles, one can see the confusion in modern trade secret law, along 
with the potential for trampling and distorting core theoretical 
concepts in this arena.  And as always, the risk of distortion is great 
when an area of law is developing and expanding rapidly. If society 
fails to impose some measure of logic and order, a dangerous 
overreach of trade secret claims may be upon us.  
 
We will refer to negotiated drug prices in the pharmaceutical context 
as “naked price” and will frame the issues at the heart of these 
debates in the following manner.  First, are naked prices intellectual 
property?  Second, if so, do they constitute sufficient intellectual 
property to create an immunity to public disclosure when the public 
interest is strong?  In other words, if naked price is an appropriate 
form of intellectual property, is it a “thin” right?   
 
The issues are playing out on a broad, national platform. Middle 
players in the drug distribution chain called Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers (PBMs) insist that their pricing arrangements with 
pharmaceutical manufacturers constitute “trade secrets.” On the 
other side, state regulators seek disclosure of such information to 
expose industry structures that drive up pricing and harm the public, 
arguing that such arrangements should not receive trade secret 
protection.  We discuss recent examples in Nevada, California, and 
Ohio, as well as the broader history of pricing in civil trade secret 
and Freedom of Information Act disputes.  As we will demonstrate, 
it is not clear that courts, regulators, or legislatures have sufficiently 
focused on whether such pricing actually can be claimed as a trade 
secret, or whether such claims have firm support in the theoretical 
foundations of trade secret law.   
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That clash – and the theoretical question of whether pricing, at least 
in this context, is a proper subject for trade secrecy claims at all – is 
the primary focus of this Article.  Indeed, this essay traces the 
emergence of naked price as a claimed trade secret.  It suggests that 
such claims, at least in the context of PBM pharmaceutical pricing 
arrangements, are not well-grounded in the theory of trade secret 
law.  Building upon the pioneering insights of earlier commentators, 
we offer a theory of why this type of pricing should not receive trade 
secret protection – or, if it does, why such protection should be thin 
and undeserving of immunity from regulation in the public interest.  
In summary, we propose the following: 
• Industry claims that naked price constitutes a protectable 
trade secret in the PBM pharmaceutical context pose a threat 
to consumers, and more broadly reflect a worrying trend 
towards overreach in trade secret law; 
• A property-centered theory of trade secret law poses the best 
approach for challenging such assertions; 
• A new concept of “thin” trade secret rights, inspired by 
analogous concepts in copyright law, can be applied to naked 
price. Thus, even if PBM pricing arrangements made it 
across the line for trade secret status, such protection would 
not pose an impassable barrier to appropriate regulatory 
disclosure. 
• By harmonizing different strands of recent commentary 
about overreaching trade secret claims in a host of areas 
outside the typical trade secret litigation context, it is 
possible to create common theoretical approaches to similar 
public policy problems. 
 
Prior literature, examining trade secret protection in the context of 
medical device pricing, focusses on an element of the 1939 
Restatement of Torts which predates the passage of modern federal 
and state legislation.  In contrast, we analyze the modern landscape 
under the recently enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act and the modern 
state Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), diving into the underlying 
theory of trade secrecy to make sense of this intersection of 
intellectual property and regulatory disclosure. We conclude that 
naked price information is not a good candidate for trade secret 
status, especially when proffered to inhibit regulatory disclosure in 
the pharmaceutical pricing context where the public interest is 
strong.   
 
This Article demonstrates how existing trade secret doctrines 
provide the tools that courts and regulators can use when grappling 
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with industry claims that PBM pricing constitutes trade secrets.  
Borrowing from the world of civil trade secret litigation, we point 
to requirements that a trade secret claimant specifically identify each 
separate asserted trade secret with particularity, that artificial 
combination trade secret claims be disaggregated, and that sweeping 
claims that entire fields or subject areas constitute trade secrets be 
challenged.  Courts and regulators need not give credence to 
conclusory declarations of trade secrecy and ghostwritten affidavits 
from the industry. 
 
Ultimately, our specific proposals regarding PBM pricing and our 
more general philosophical statements regarding the normative 
grounding of trade secret claims stem from the observation that the 
statutes which grant trade secret rights are not absolutes.  They 
reflect utilitarian economic legislation designed to balance the 
respective interests of employers, employees, business partners, and 
the public by creating limited rights to incentivize investment in 
research and laboratory infrastructure. Trade secrets are not some 
objective, metaphysical rights found in nature.  Indeed, both the 
Federal Act and the state Uniform Trade Secrets Acts are riddled 
with limitations and exceptions, from the right of others to 
independently develop the exact same information and to discern the 
trade secret through reverse engineering, to the simple loss of rights 
if the owner fails to use appropriate security measures.  This is not 
an impregnable fortress against regulatory disclosure. Moreover, 
neither the Federal Act nor the state Uniform Trade Secret Acts were 
intended to radically enlarge trade secret protection – they seek 
uniformity and clarity while offering a generally balanced regime.15   
 
 
15 Compared to the prior Restatement approach, the Federal Act and state statutes 
both strengthened and weakened the scope of trade secret protection on different 
points, leading to a general balance rather than a radical departure in either 
direction.  The statutes, however, arguably offer a somewhat narrower regime.  
For example, the statutes enlarged trade secret protection by rejecting the notion 
that information must remain in continuous use to qualify for trade secrecy, and 
the Federal Act increased protection for overseas activity.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1837.  
But they also weakened protection by (in the case of most state statutes) 
preempting broader, conflicting tort claims, and (in the case of the Federal Act) 
creating a regime for disclosure by whistleblowers.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b).  In 
addition, the Federal Act and almost all state statutes enacted a provision 
providing for an award of attorneys’ fees to the defense in cases of “bad faith” – 
a disincentive for a plaintiff to pursue weak claims for anticompetitive or 
malicious purposes.  E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D).  As the commentary to the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act notes, a primary goal of the statutes was “substitution 
of unitary definitions of trade secret and trade secret misappropriation, and a 
single statute of limitations for the various property, quasi-contractual, and 
violation of fiduciary relationship theories of noncontractual liability utilized at 
common law.”  UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, commissioner’s prefatory note, 
at 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1980). 
 69 
As with other areas of intellectual property law, then, trade secret 
law is not a mere contest of private commercial interests.  Rather, it 
embeds a substantial dedication to the public interest by maintaining 
a robust public domain excepting only that information which meets 
the criteria of trade secrecy.  But these themes are underdeveloped, 
especially outside the civil litigation context.  We aim to bring trade 
secret into greater harmony with broad concepts that reach across all 
of the intellectual property regimes, learning from society’s 
experience in each. Similarly, in developing the concept of “thin” 
trade secret protection, we look to the analogous concept of thin 
protection for certain categories of work in copyright.  We also look 
to the emerging theory of trade secret misuse, which itself builds on 
doctrines in patent and copyright.  In each of these contexts, this 
Article offers the potential of anchoring trade secret more firmly to 
its theoretical base, as well as bringing trade secret closer to the 
family of other intellectual property regimes. Although squabbling, 
chaotic, and somewhat dispersed, all members of this time-honored 
family can learn from each other, sharing their battle-worn wisdom 
regarding this still-developing area. 
 
I.  THE PROBLEM:  PBM PRICING AND TRADE SECRECY 
ASSERTIONS  
 
Prescription drug prices in the United States are rising at an 
uncomfortable pace.  New drugs on the market continue to break 
ground, not just for their therapeutic value, but for their higher and 
higher price points.  For example, Novartis raised eyebrows in 2017 
by introducing its leukemia drug Kymriah at a price point of 
$475,000.16  Within two years, however, that ground-breaking price 
was left in the dust by the $2.125 million price tag of Novartis’ new 
drug Zolgensma, 17  which treats pediatric spinal atrophy and by 
Spark Therapeutics’ Luxturna, which treats a rare form of blindness 
and costs a hefty $850,000 for a one-time treatment.18  
 
As the health care system struggles to swallow these bitter pills, 
medicines for ordinary conditions are causing their fair share of pain. 
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
 
16 See Paul Kleutghen et al., Drugs Don’t Work if People Can’t Afford Them: The 
High Price of Tisagenlecleucel, HEALTH AFF. (2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180205.292531/full. 
17 See Adam Feuerstein, At $2.1 Million, Newly Approved Novartis Gene Therapy 
Will Be World’s Most Expensive Drug, STAT+ (May 24, 2019), 
https://www.statnews.com/2019/05/24/hold-novartis-zolgensma-approval.  
18  See Meg Tirrell, A U.S. Drugmaker Offers to Cure Rare Blindness for 
$850,000, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/03/spark-
therapeutics-luxturna-gene-therapy-will-cost-about-850000.html.  
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the most costly drugs for Medicare patients in recent years were for 
common conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease, and asthma.19 
These drugs also experienced the sharpest price hikes as well.20 
Although drug companies provide substantial rebates and discounts 
on their medications in certain circumstances, net price increases 
continue to climb, 21  pushing real spending ever higher. On the 
whole, between 2011 and 2015, Medicare spending for branded 
drugs rose 62%.22  The increase during this period appears to be 
attributable in large part to rising prices on existing medications.23 
Prices in the United States are far above prices in other developed 
countries.24 
 
The economic implications are troubling on many levels.  For 
individual budgets, both studies and anecdotes demonstrate that 
some patients are choosing to forgo medication or to engage in 
rationing in response to cost pressures. 25  For government budgets, 
 
19 See HHS INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 3. 
20 See id. 
21 See FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 9–11 (describing rising real prices and noting 
that many people do pay for the high list price, either due to lack of insurance, to 
meet a deductible, or as the basis of co-insurance); Workshop Slides, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Entry and 
Supply Chain Dynamics 107 (2017), www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-
calendar/2017/11/understanding-competition-prescription-drug-markets-entry-
supply (estimating that net prices increased 4.5% in 2014); Dylan Scott, Inside 
the Impossibly Byzantine World of Prescription Drug Prices, STAT (Dec. 21, 
2015), www.statnews.com/2015/12/21/prescription-drug-prices-confusion. 
(pharmaceutical trade group report at FTC roundtable estimating that list prices 
increased 3.5% in 2014). These increases far outpace inflation, which ranged from 
less than 1% to 2% during the relevant period. See Current U.S. Inflation Rates: 
2008 to 2018, U.S. INFLATION CALCULATOR (2018), 
www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/current-inflation-rates.  
22 HHS INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 3, at 4 (documenting the rise in total 
spending despite the fact that rebates increased from $58 billion to $102 billion 
during the period). 
23 See Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Report to the Congress:  Medicare 
Payment Policy 408 (2017) (concluding that rising prices on branded medications 
are overwhelming the savings from generics). 
24  See Simon F. Haeder, Why the US Has Higher Drug Prices Than Other 
Countries, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 7, 2019), https://theconversation.com/why-
the-us-has-higher-drug-prices-than-other-countries-111256; Robert Langreth, 
Drug Prices, BLOOMBERG, (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/drug-prices. 
25  See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., MAKING MEDICINES 
AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 110, 116 (Norman R. Augustine, Guru 
Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass, eds.,  2017) (explaining that patient “sticker shock” 
at the pharmacy leads them to forgo filling the prescription or extend their 
medication by reducing dosages); see also Robyn Tamblyn et al., The Incidence 
and Determinants of Primary Nonadherence with Prescribed Medication in 
Primary Care: A Cohort Study, 160 ANN. INTERN. MED. 441–50 (2014) (study 
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the increasing costs are placing great strain on state and federal 
coffers, as officials struggle to find the necessary resources. In the 
words of Andy Slavitt, the former Acting Administrator of the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, these prices are simply 
“unsustainable.”26  
 
One would expect market forces to mitigate the rising costs. 
Unfortunately, perverse incentives, along with externalities and 
information asymmetries, operate to blunt the natural competitive 
forces society might otherwise enjoy.27 To begin with, the normal 
valuation process that help buyers choose among different types of 
expenditures—buying a suit as opposed to dinner at a restaurant—
become distorted in the health care setting. My life and my health 
may be of infinite value to me, particularly when someone else is 
footing the bill. In that manner, both the valuation and the true cost 
of the goods are lost, given the nature of the goods and our third-
party payor system.28   
 
 
showing that patients with higher co-pays, recent hospitalizations, other severe 
health problems, or combinations of these factors were less likely to fill their 
prescriptions); PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL, PROMOTING VALUE, 
AFFORDABILITY, AND INNOVATION IN CANCER DRUG TREATMENT. A REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL 
17 (Mar. 2018), https://prescancerpanel.cancer.gov/report/drugvalue/pdf/ 
PresCancerPanel_DrugValue_Mar2018.pdf (detailing that higher out-of-pocket 
costs makes it less likely for patients to adhere to recommended treatment 
regimens or undergo financial hardship); Financial Toxicity and Cancer 
Treatment (PDQ®)–Health Professional Version, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/managing-care/track-care-costs/financial-
toxicity-hp-pdq (last visited May 3, 2018) (study on financial burden of cancer 
treatments noting how high costs have resulted in cancer patients selling property 
and other assets, incurring medical debt, reducing spending on necessities, 
changing housing, and declaring bankruptcy). 
26 See Ed Silverman, CMS Official Says Drug Costs Are “Unsustainable” and 
There Are Too Many Bad Actors, STAT (Nov. 7, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/07/medicare-medicaid-drug-
prices.  
27 See Robin Feldman, Perverse Incentives: Why Everyone Prefers High Drug 
Prices—Except for Those Who Pay the Bills, HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming) 
(describing perverse incentives and strategic behaviors in this highly regulated 
industry), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3162432; Fiona 
Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in the Pharmaceutical 
Markets 2 (Hutchins Ctr. On Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y at Brookings, Working 
Paper No. 30, 2017) (explaining that externalities and information asymmetries 
prevent consumers from optimal substitution because they do not bear full costs 
and lack medical expertise or reliable information to identify therapeutic 
equivalents). 
28 See FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 7, 88–93 (describing buying distortions in health 
care and the problems with value-based pricing in that context). 
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Other perverse incentives flow from the structure of industry, with 
its central players the Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).  PBMs 
are middle players between drug companies and insurance plans—
including both private insurers and Medicare. On behalf of 
insurance plans and patients, PBMs negotiate the prices of drugs 
with the companies. PBMs also help the plans set formularies, which 
determine whether patients will have access to a particular drug and 
the terms of that access.  In an ideal world, this system would allow 
insurance plans and patients to pay the lowest cost possible for 
brand-name drugs.  In reality, the deals between PBMs and brand 
companies frequently operate to channel patients into more 
expensive drugs, with resulting long-term and short-term effects on 
the system.  
 
Although a full discussion of the PBMs and the drug supply chain 
is beyond the scope of this Article, 29 certain aspects are important 
for understanding the role that assertions of trade secrecy are playing 
in this space.  In simplified form, PBMs stand between their clients 
(the health plans) and drug companies. Although a health plan 
knows what it pays when a patient buys a particular drug at the 
pharmacy, the true price is hidden. Somewhere down the line, the 
health plan will receive a rebate check from the PBM that includes 
rebates for this, and many other, drug transactions. Along the way, 
PBMs pocket a large portion of the rebate dollars—as much as $166 
billion each year30 by one estimate—although the health plans are 
not permitted to know the size of the rebates or the portions retained. 
In fact, the true net price, and the terms of the agreements between 
PBMs and drug companies are highly guarded secrets; even the 
health plan’s auditors are not given full access to the agreements.31 
Moreover, given that PBMs help create their clients’ formularies, 
PBMs and drug companies can strike deals that may not be in the 
patient’s long-term interests. Recent case allegations and press 
reports have described patients who are forced to pay more for 
generics than for brand name drugs and patients completely blocked 
from access to generic versions of a drug.  For example, a complaint 
filed in 2017 alleges that Allergan’s rebate scheme for its 
blockbuster dry-eye drug Restasis blocked access for competing 
 
29 For in an in-depth analysis of PBMs and perverse incentives in the drug supply 
and pricing chain, see generally id. 
30 See Peter Pitts, The White House’s About-Face on Drug Rebates Is a Loss for 
Public Health, STAT (July 11, 
2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/07/11/drug-rebates-white-house-
decision. 
31 See Robin Feldman, Secrets, Conspiracies, and Rx Money—Here’s Why Drug 
Prices Are Out of Control, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 6, 2019) 
https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/generalprofessionalissues/7
9644; see also FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 2–3 n.16. 
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generics. 32   One Medicare plan administrator quoted in the 
complaint explained that with the particular scheme, a new entrant 
could give its drug away for free and still would not be able to gain 
a foothold in the market.33  Similarly, a recent case alleges that 
Johnson and Johnson launched a rebate scheme for its rheumatoid 
arthritis drug Remicade that induced hospitals and health plans to 
essentially exclude the lower-priced biosimilar. 34  One physician 
called practices such as these “Alice-in-Wonderland” in the drug 
world.35 Moreover, these deals can maximize the payments that the 
PBMs are able to keep, while keeping patients away from cheaper 
generic drugs.  
 
 In addition, although PBMs represent the health plan as its clients, 
the PBMs receive various large payments directly from the drug 
companies. As well as the rebate portions mentioned above, PBMs 
also receive various fees from drug companies, such as “data 
management fees” and “administrative fees.”36 With the formulary 
power of PBMs, these fees have the potential to encourage PBMs to 
drive patients toward the companies that are offering more attractive 
terms to them as a middle player, regardless of whether those terms 
benefit patients in either the short or long-term. Again, these fees are 
hidden from the health plan, from regulators, and from the public.37  
 
 
32 Complaint at 6, 21–23, Shire US, Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 538 
(D.N.J. 2019) (No. 17-7716).  
33 See id. at 23–24 (Shire, the manufacturer of a competing drug called Xiidra, 
states in the complaint that “Shire…has been told by Part D plans that even if 
Shire gave Xiidra to Part D plans ‘for free,’ it could not make up for the plans’ 
loss of rebates across Allergan’s Part D product portfolio.”)   
34 See Complaint at 1, Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494 
(E.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 17-cv-4180); see also FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 26 n. 43 
(case settled for $61.5 million alleging that when Sanofi faced competition on its 
pediatric meningitis vaccine Menactra, the company charged 34% higher prices 
unless buyers purchased all of Sanofi’s vaccines exclusively). 
35 Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Take the Generic, Patients Are Told. Until 
They Are Not., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/health/prescription-drugs-brand-name-
generic.html (documenting patients who were forced to pay more for generic 
Adderall). 
36 See, e.g., Complaint at 6, Boss v. CVS Corp., No. 17-01823, (D.N.J., Mar. 17, 
2017) (arguing that payments other than rebates are provided under a variety of 
labels, including discounts, credits, concession fees, etc.); see also Linda Cahn, 
Don’t Get Trapped By PBMs’ Rebate Labeling Games, MANAGED CARE (Jan. 1, 
2009), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2009/1/don-t-get-trapped-
pbms-rebate-labeling-games. 
37  PBMs that are public companies are required to provide SEC filings with 
aggregate numbers related to their revenue. PBMs have resisted efforts by the 
SEC to provide even modest amounts of additional information. See FELDMAN, 
supra note 5, at 98.  
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One might think that the health plans and their patients, let alone 
government auditors, would have the right to know the net prices 
they are paying for each drug and to access the terms of agreements 
made on their behalf.  So, just how is it that these terms are so deeply 
hidden?  PBMs and drug companies claim that net price is a trade 
secret.  It is under the cloak of trade secrecy that this system, and its 
impact on rising prices, remains sheltered from view.   
 
Lack of transparency prevents regulators from ferreting out 
information and evaluating the behavior they are charged with 
regulating. State and federal regulators govern the pharmaceutical 
supply chain in myriad ways. Below are a sample of those 
regulations, although a full description is well beyond the Article’s 
scope. At the federal level, various agencies work in conjunction to 
regulate the supply chain. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) oversees the delivery of pharmaceuticals in those 
systems in hospitals and at pharmacies. Considering retail sales 
alone, Medicaid and Medicare Part D payments account for 40% of 
prescription drug spending.38 CMS also issues guidance documents 
and proposes rules to explain how laws will be implemented, clarify 
existing guidance, and address policy issues such as cost 
transparency and spread pricing by pharmacy benefit managers.39 
The FDA plays a crucial role in establishing pathways for drug 
approval and regulating consumer disclosure. Since the enactment 
of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Congress has tasked the 
FDA with ensuring the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical 
products. Various statutes such as the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
in 1938 and the 1962 Amendments to the FDC Act have given the 
FDA the requisite authority to control labeling and advertising as 
well as the development and approval processes for pharmaceuticals. 
 
38 See Juliette Cubanski, Matthew Rae, Katherine Young & Anthony Damico, 
How Does Prescription Drug Spending and Use Compare Across Large 
Employer Plans, Medicare Part D, and Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 20, 
2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/how-does-prescription-drug-
spending-and-use-compare-across-large-employer-plans-medicare-part-d-and-
medicaid. 
39 See Press Release, Cntrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Takes Bold 
Action to Implement Key Elements of President Trump’s Executive Order to 
Empower Patients with Price Transparency and Increase Competition to Lower 
Costs for Medicare Beneficiaries (July 29, 2019), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-takes-bold-action-
implement-key-elements-president-trumps-executive-order-empower-patients-
price; Press Release, Cntrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Issues New 
Guidance Addressing Spread Pricing in Medicaid, Ensures Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers Are Not Up-Charging Taxpayers (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-issues-new-guidance-
addressing-spread-pricing-medicaid-ensures-pharmacy-benefit-managers-are-
not. 
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The FDA also participates in the rulemaking process and publishes 
regulations and guidances on existing rules and arising issues.40 The 
FTC and DOJ oversee mergers and challenge anticompetitive 
behavior such as pay-for-delay tactics. Pay-for-delay agreements, 
also known as reverse settlement agreements, involve brand-name 
drug companies paying their generic competitors to delay market 
entry, effectively blocking generic competition for brand-name 
drugs.41 The USPTO is another major player within pharmaceutical 
regulation. Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is incentivized 
by patent protection benefits, and the USPTO decides whether a 
pharmaceutical invention is sufficiently innovative to deserve patent 
protection. 
 
At the state level, state attorneys general have the power to challenge 
anticompetitive behaviors under state antitrust laws and to allow in-
state mergers to go forward only on the condition of conduct 
remedies supervised by the state. Such state antitrust regimes may 
be broader than and differ from the federal regime.42 State consumer 
protection statutes regulate the information provided to consumers 
and unfair business practices. Regulation of insurance, which 
includes regulation of the health insurance industry has been largely 
a matter of state law since the congressional Kefauver amendment. 
Medicaid is a federal program administered by the states, which 
provides additional state regulation of pharmaceuticals. More 
broadly, every state has its own laws and regulations guiding 
 
40  See generally Guidances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/guidances (“Guidance 
documents describe FDA’s interpretation of our policy on a regulatory issue (21 
CFR 10.115(b)). These documents usually discuss more specific products or 
issues that relate to the design, production, labeling, promotion, manufacturing, 
and testing of regulated products.”). 
41 See ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA 
RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 34 (2017) (outlining the 
basic contours of pay-for-delay settlements).  
42 See, e.g., California Cartwright Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700–16758 
(1907) (barring price-fixing and market-allocation agreements among 
competitors by way of a more detailed list of transgressions than the Sherman 
Act's general prohibitions against "restraints of trade;” allowing purchasers to sue 
and recover “regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly 
with the defendant” whereas federal antitrust law does not allow recovery by an 
indirect purchaser);California Unfair Practices Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 
17000–17101 (1941) (allowing suits by private parties to be brought in the state 
courts; prohibiting sales below cost undertaken with a purpose to injure 
competitors, price discrimination between different localities undertaken with an 
intent to injure competitors, and secret rebates given to some purchasers but not 
to others and that are injurious to competition; unlike its federal counterpart, the 
Robinson-Patman Act, the California Unfair Practices Act is not limited to price 
discrimination on commodities but also extends to services and intangibles and 
may include intellectual property.). 
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pharmacy standards and requirements; these rules govern issues 
such as compounding, manufacturing, enforcement, licensing, and 
transparency.43 
 
It is important to note that while government at both the federal and 
state levels plays a crucial role, government cannot be expected to 
do everything. As described below, intellectual property theory rests 
against a backdrop of faith in the importance of competition and the 
efficiency of open markets.44 Despite extensive regulation in the 
health care system, society continues to depend on fair, open, and 
competitive markets—markets that cannot function effectively 
without a sufficient flow of information. Moreover, in the increasing 
complexity of modern society, other actors play important roles in 
fostering the flow of information that allows government regulators 
to respond to market imperfection and manipulation, as well as 
shining light on areas of the market that may be ripe for competition 
and disruption. In short, an efficient and well-functioning 
pharmaceutical market thrives on the sunlight of information; it 
would wither in the dark. 
 
Public outcry over rising prices in the United States, particularly in 
contrast to comparable countries across the globe, has prompted 
numerous legislative and regulatory attempts to reform the system. 
More than 40 states have introduced legislation to address rising 
pharmaceutical pricing, with many of those bills directed at 
transparency in drug pricing. Transparency has been an issue for 
Congress and federal regulators as well, with the introduction of 
transparency bills and regulations.45  
 
 
43 See State Regulation of Compounding Pharmacies, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 1, 2014), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/regulating-compounding-pharmacies.aspx; 
SUMEET SINGH & SAMUEL M. SMITH, DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO STATE REGULATION 
OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 3 (Five Rivers RX 2018). 
44 See infra text accompanying notes 182–187. 
45  E.g., Drug Price Transparency Act, H.R. 2087, 116th Cong. (2019); 
Prescription Drug Price Transparency Act, H.R. 1035, 116th Cong. (2019); see 
also Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, S. 2554, 115th Cong. (2018) 
(enacted) (prohibiting gag clauses, which were contractual clauses that prevented 
pharmacists from letting patients know that it would be cheaper to pay for a drug 
out-of-pocket); 84 Fed. Reg. 2340–2363 (Feb. 6, 2019) (proposed rebate rule later 
withdrawn that also would have required that PBMs disclose to their clients (the 
insurance plans) the services rendered to each drug company they negotiated with 
on behalf of the insurance plan); see also Merck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., No. 19-cv-01738 (APM), 2019 WL 2931591 (D.D.C. July 8, 
2019) (overturning Health and Human Services regulation requiring that drug 
companies include list prices in their advertisements; overturned on the grounds 
that the agency lacked Congressional authority for the regulation). 
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As state actors have sought to regulate or even investigate 
pharmaceutical pricing and practices, they have run into claims of 
trade secrecy.  For example, Caremark is one of three major 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers that control 85% of the market. When 
the State of Ohio investigated in 2018 how PBMs spent state and 
federal funds, a third party prepared a report for the state which 
included details of such spending.  Caremark then objected to 
publication of the report, filed a lawsuit seeking to suppress the 
report. In shrill language, the Pharmacy Benefit Manager argued 
that pricing information regarding prescription drugs in its contracts 
with entities that manage Medicaid for patients constituted 
“proprietary” “trade secrets,” such that publication would be 
“devastating,” with “severe financial harm” to its business.46  Trying 
to have it both ways, Caremark represented that the report it did not 
want the public to read found that “allegations against Caremark 
were not true” with respect to “preferential pricing.”47  Along the 
same lines, a California court enjoined the state from publishing 
information about a pharmaceutical company’s planned drug price 
increases before those prices would go into effect on the ground that 
for purposes of the order, the information constituted trade secrets.48 
 
 
46 See Complaint at ¶¶ 18, 25, 27–30, 38, 79–85, CaremarkPCS Health, LLC v. 
Sears, No. 18-cv-5943 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. July 16, 2018) [Hereinafter, “Caremark 
Complaint”].  The State of Ohio responded to Caremark’s request for temporary 
injunctive relief to suppress publication by arguing that Caremark could not assert 
trade secret projection because it failed to undertake reasonable security measures 
regarding the information at issue.  See Memorandum for Defendant Against 
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, CaremarkPCS, No. 18-cv-
5943 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2018), 
<https://issuu.com/thecolumbusdispatch/docs/combinepdf__4_>. Although the 
complaint focused on contracts between the Caremark PBM and various health 
plans, it is possible that the material at issue included information about 
agreements between the PBM and pharmaceutical manufacturers. The complaint 
refers ambiguously to “pricing structures, fees, and details about Caremark’s 
bidding and contracting process” and to “contract, pricing, fee, and rebate 
information.” See Caremark Complaint at ¶¶ 46, 62. Those terms could refer 
solely to Caremark’s bidding and contracting with its PBM clients; alternatively, 
they could include bidding and contracting with suppliers such as pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. The judge granted the temporary injunction, and the case is 
pending (scheduled for trial March 9, 2020).  
47 See Caremark Complaint at ¶ 61. 
48  See Order Granting Petitioner Amgen Inc.’s Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction, Amgen Inc. v. Cal. Corr. Health Serv., No. 18-stcp-03147 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 11, 2019). For a discussion of how California might structure its 
transparency regulations to avoid a charge of trade secret misappropriation, see 
Katherine L. Gudiksen, Samuel M. Chang & Jaime S. King, The Secret of Health 
Care Prices: Why Transparency Is in the Public Interest, CAL. HEALTH CARE 
FOUND. (July 16, 2019), https://www.chcf.org/publication/secret-health-care-
prices. 
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Another assertion of trade secrecy arose in a Nevada case in 2017. 
The state of Nevada passed a statute aiming at curtailing rising 
diabetes drug prices requiring manufacturers and Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers to disclose cost and pricing information for diabetes drugs 
to the state, with some information to be publicly available. In 
response, the pharmaceutical industry trade association, known by 
the acronym “PhRMA,” sought injunctive relief to prevent 
implementation of the statute. The industry made stark predictions 
that the statute “undermin[es] innovation and competition in the 
American pharmaceutical industry,” “violates the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment” by depriving affected manufacturers of trade-
secret protection,” and “strips pharmaceutical manufacturers of 
trade secret protection for confidential, completely sensitive, 
proprietary information regarding the production, cost, pricing, 
marketing, and advertising of their patented diabetes medicines.”49   
 
To support those arguments, a group of pharmaceutical executives 
filed separate affidavits duly repeating that the “factors considered 
in setting and adjusting the prices of our products and the percentage 
of our profits that derive from diabetes drugs are confidential and 
proprietary,” and that “[o]ur customers and competitors would gain 
a competitive advantage over [each company] if they were to obtain” 
such information,50 and thus the companies would be endangered 
should the State of Nevada require disclosure of pricing information 
for diabetes treatments. The affidavits contained almost verbatim 
language. 
 
These court submissions by the industry beg the question of whether 
one can make something a trade secret simply by repeatedly, and 
aggressively asserting, that it is so, when no specific legislative 
enactment (as of yet) precludes taking such a position.  Thankfully, 
trade secret law has long been aware of this “it is, because I say so” 
problem.  In the traditional context of employer/employee trade 
secret litigation, companies sometimes have sought to establish 
 
49  See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction at 1–2, 15–19, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 
2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 2017).  The motion was denied, and 
the plaintiffs ultimately voluntarily dismissed the case due to what was vaguely 
portrayed as changed circumstances.  See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. Oct. 
17, 2017), ECF No. 61; Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal 
Without Prejudice, Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. June 28, 
2018), ECF No. 96. 
50 See Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Declarations of C. 
Marsh (Boehringer Ingelheim), S. Albers (Novo Nordisk), P. Davish (Merck), D. 
Asay (Lilly), J. Borneman (Sanofi), Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. 
Nev. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF No. 26. 
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trade secrecy by pointing to broadly-worded employment 
agreements which declare, in conclusory language, that a swath of 
the company’s information and products constitute confidential 
information.  Courts have rejected such assertions. Whether an item 
of information meets the objective elements required to demonstrate 
that a trade secret exists is not the same thing as whether the 
company labeled something as a trade secret.51 Stating in a contract 
that information is confidential may provide evidence that a 
company employed security measures to protect potential trade 
secrets.  Protecting one’s information, however, is merely one aspect 
of the test for trade secrecy, and it is by no means dispositive on its 
own.52    
 
II.  EXPANDING ASSERTIONS OF TRADE SECRECY AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST  
 
To set the stage for our discussion of trade secrecy and PBM pricing, 
we start by placing trade secret law in its IP context.  Trade secrets 
are the broadest category of intellectual property law and encompass 
the most diverse forms of information.  That is so because a trade 
secret can constitute many types of business information, and 
because no formal registration or government approval is necessary 
for rights to accrue.  A claimant with a valid trade secret need only 
establish secrecy, the use of reasonable security measures, and 
economic value to others driven by secrecy.53   
 
Although trade secret law differs significantly from patent law and 
copyright law, it is more closely related to both than may commonly 
be recognized.  As to patent law, every patentable invention begins 
its life upon conception and reduction to practice as a trade secret, 
and it is only when the owner elects to file a patent application 
(which will eventually be published) that trade secret rights make 
 
51 See, e.g., Sun Media Sys., Inc. v. KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946, 964–965 
(S.D. Iowa 2008) (“Plaintiff cannot, however, use the confidentiality clause in the 
KDSM contract to turn items into trade secrets that simply are not trade secrets 
under applicable law.”); JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.04 (2017) (“[O]ne 
may not create a trade secret by merely characterizing something as such in a 
contract.”). 
52 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (one element of the test for trade secrecy is whether 
“the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information 
secret[.]”). 
53 See id. (defining trade secrecy).  Like almost all state versions of the Uniform 
Act, the Federal Act has a four-element test:  the item of information must not be 
generally known to the relevant persons, it cannot be readily ascertainable, it must 
have independent economic value to competitors as a result of secrecy, and it must 
be the software of reasonable steps to secure confidentiality. 
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way for patent rights.  As to copyright law, some forms of 
information— particularly software source code—can be the subject 
of copyright protection and trade secret protection at the same time.  
Copyright law protects the expression, while trade secret law 
protects the ideas instantiated in code that meets the requirements of 
trade secrecy.  As a result, it would be a mistake to treat trade secret 
law as a remote branch of intellectual property law, unconnected to 
the public policy concerns that have been prevalent in the patent and 
copyright literature for many years. 
 
That said, trade secret law stands in particular contrast to patent law 
in the pantheon of intellectual property rights.  With patents, for 
example, society allows suppression of competition for a limited 
period of time in exchange for publicly disclosing the invention.54 
The mighty patent packs a short but powerful punch.  It blocks out 
all competition, even from those who invent independently, for a 
shorter period of time and only in exchange for sharing the 
information with society at large. With trade secret, however, there 
is no quid pro quo to society of disclosure of the invention; and the 
secret potentially can last forever.  And in contrast to patent law, a 
competitor company that creates the same thing independently can 
use it freely under trade secret law.55 With this fundamental tenet, 
trade secret strays far from the notion of providing the possibility of 
a monopoly,56 and as a result, trade secret is not designed to suppress 
competition in the same manner as patent. Moreover, once enough 
people in the given industry or market know the secret, or even 
reasonably could ascertain it with a minimum of time and labor, 
protection ends. Thus, trade secret is far less focused on allowing 
the suppression of competition with an iron fist than the more 
familiar patent law context.  Trade secret law instead primarily 
focuses on those in privity with the putative rights-holder—those 
who had access to the plaintiff’s intellectual property under a 
confidentiality restriction. As with copyright,57 trade secret is less of 
an all-powerful right. The potential for longer periods of protection 
is balanced by the fact that such rights are subject to many more 
 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
55 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (noting that independent development, which 
means developing the same or similar information as another’s trade secret 
through independent effort, is not “improper means” and thus does not constitute 
trade secret misappropriation). 
56  For a discussion of the fact that patent law provides an opportunity for a 
monopoly, rather than an assurance of a monopoly, see ROBIN FELDMAN, 
RETHINKING PATENT LAW 23–39 (2012). 
57 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 160–171 (discussing fair use exception 
to copyright). 
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exceptions reflecting contexts in which other societal interests are at 
play.  
 
The fact that a company would suffer competitive harm if 
information were released does not mean, in and of itself, that 
release of the information would implicate trade secret rights. That 
distinction is critically important in trade secret law. For example, if 
an employee quits, starts a competing business, and uses his or her 
general skills, knowledge, and training gained from that job to 
attract the former employer’s customers and thereby harm the 
former employer, that harm is not evidence that the employer had 
trade secrets, or that the employee misused trade secrets.  While the 
former employer suffered competitive harm, the information the 
former employee used to inflict that harm—skills, knowledge, and 
training that do not constitute trade secrets58—is not something that 
can be propertized, nor is the harm something for which one can 
seek legal redress. Similarly, that a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
might suffer harm if pricing information were disclosed does not, in 
and of itself, serve to establish an intellectual property right. 
 
And of course, the basis of this analysis rings true throughout 
intellectual property law. Suffering competitive harm does not 
establish that intellectual property exists. Rather, the establishment 
of the intellectual property right must come first. The fact that 
competitors could beat a company is generally a cause for 
celebration in a competitive economy, rather than a legal cause of 
action. Intellectual property rights are limited exceptions to that 
general rule. And in the utilitarian context of United States 
intellectual property law, those rights are granted for the purpose of 
advancing society as a whole, not the individual creator. Despite 
strains of moral rights theory in the intellectual property traditions 
of nations such as France, the United States’ intellectual property 
regime remains unabashedly utilitarian.59   
 
 
58 See generally Kurt M. Saunders & Nina Golden, Skill or Secret? – The Line 
Between Trade Secrets and Employee General Skills and Knowledge, 15 N.Y.U.  
J. L. & BUS. 61 (2018) (analyzing factors courts have used over the years to 
separate protectable trade secrets from unprotectable general skills, knowledge, 
training, and experience). 
59 Although certain treaty obligations give a nod to French notions of moral rights 
that ground in some areas of intellectual property, the U.S. intellectual property 
legal tradition remains firmly rooted in utilitarianism. For a discussion of these 
issues, although with a more general discussion of utilitarianism and 
consequentialism, see FELDMAN, supra note 56, at 76–79 (citing Graham v. John 
Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) for the proposition that “[t]he patent monopoly was 
not designed to secure the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it 
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”). 
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These foundations, therefore, provide the underpinning of trade 
secret law. Despite these moorings, trade secret law faces real risk 
that it will be pulled in overreaching directions, a problem 
exemplified by the case of the regulatory disclosure debates.  And 
indeed, the problem addressed in this Article is just one instance of 
a wider issue: increasingly, companies are attempting to assert trade 
secrecy claims outside the commonplace civil litigation context in 
order to block regulatory oversight or public inquiry into potentially 
unsavory business practices.  To what degree can trade secret claims 
be asserted to shield such practices, weighed against harm to 
consumers, patients, voters, government agencies, and others?  This 
discussion should not occur in isolation—that is, it cannot be 
focused solely on pharmaceutical pricing information in PBM 
agreements.  Rather, the pharmaceutical pricing debates reveal 
emerging doctrinal and theoretical tensions, and resolution of the 
issue can provide overarching theoretical points of value for more 
widespread concerns regarding overbroad, overreaching assertions 
of trade secrecy rights. 
 
 Although overbroad trade secrecy assertions are not new, the 
problem now extends far beyond traditional civil litigation disputes 
between former employers and departing employees—the 
customary domain of trade secret law. Recent scholarship has 
highlighted problems in a variety of doctrinal arenas including that 
trade secrecy claims have been raised to block criminal defendants 
from examining the technologies used to convict them60 and the 
need to protect whistleblowers from assertions of 
misappropriation.61  In a similar vein, companies have claimed that 
data about the ethnicity and gender of their workforce is corporate 
intellectual property, 62  there is a risk that medical device 
 
60 See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in 
the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (magisterial 
commentary describing many ways in which technologies used by the prosecution 
are withheld from defense counsel based on trade secrecy blocking tactics asserted 
as an evidentiary privilege). 
61  See Peter Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret 
Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2017) (describing an immunity for certain 
methods of whistleblowing adopted by Congress from the author for the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act); Peter Menell, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Whistleblower 
Immunity Provision:  A Legislative History, 1 BUS., ENT. & TAX L. REV. 398 
(2017) (same). 
62 See Jamillah Bowman Williams, Why Companies Shouldn’t Be Allowed to 
Treat Their Diversity Numbers as Trade Secrets, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 15, 
2019), https://hbr.org/2019/02/why-companies-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-treat-
their-diversity-numbers-as-trade-secrets (describing public policy reasons why 
diversity data should be made available, noting that the “tactic” of asserting trade 
secrecy “seems to be aimed more at avoiding bad publicity than remaining 
competitive”); Jamillah Bowman Williams, Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. 
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manufacturers may claim trade secret rights in data collected from 
patients implanted with such devices,63 and government actors and 
suppliers have claimed trade secrets in source code used for 
“automated decisionmaking” and public infrastructure, creating the 
potential to insulate public-decisions making from the normal 
scrutiny of a democratic process.64 These problems highlight the 
risks of an extraordinary expansion of trade secret claims, and the 
resulting tensions for doctrinal analysis, theoretical consistency, and 
public policy. And as trade secret issues emerge in ever-expanding 
contexts where the focus appears to be on a different set of issues 
entirely, the temptation to glide swiftly over the underlying 
intellectual property issues may be great. In those circumstances, the 
logic and doctrinal consistency of trade secret can easily be trampled.  
 
Such commentaries will doubtless increase in the years to come, 
along with the rapid expansion of trade secret and related disputes 
in our information-based economy. 65  In addressing the public 
 
L.J. 1684 (2019) (sustained analysis of policy problems and threats to employee 
mobility and opportunity when companies assert that employee diversity data 
constitutes the company’s trade secrets, with models for potential resolution: 
“[t]here is an inherent conflict between the values of trade secrecy doctrine and 
the broader goals of equal opportunity.”). 
63 See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Sharing Data, 104 IOWA L. REV. 288, 299 (2018) 
(describing how manufacturers of implanted medical devices can seek to control 
data obtained from patients under trade secret, copyright, and other legal theories). 
64 See Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1183 (2019) (discussing how treatment of source code as a trade secret 
creates negative ramifications for transparency when government entities use 
software to automate decisions; proposing numerous solutions such as limited 
access by specific reviewers and incentives for “open code initiatives”); David S. 
Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 61, 98–
100 (2018) (examining government bodies which themselves claim trade secret 
rights in information ranging from school exams to—pertinent to this article—
prices paid by the U.S. Air Force to a military contractor); David S. Levine, The 
Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF 
TRADE SECRECY (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) 
(describing how public sector infrastructure so often uses private technologies, 
leading to trade secrecy assertions to inhibit public access; describing voting 
machines and breathalyzers as examples). 
65  A timely example, as yet unexplored at a theoretical level, is the use of 
confidentiality agreements in settlements over allegations of sexual abuse and 
harassment.  See Elizabeth A. Harris, Despite #MeToo Glare, Efforts to Ban 
Secret Settlements Stop Short, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/arts/metoo-movement-nda.html 
(exploring legislative efforts, most prominently in New Jersey, to curtail the 
practice of buying silence about sexual misconduct through confidentiality 
agreements).  As Lemley and Shapiro note, there are also many other areas in 
which confidentiality claims may also be subject to critical analysis, such as patent 
license terms agreed to by companies which have made FRAND (Fair, 
Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) commitments to a standards organization, 
as well as efforts to prevent price comparisons by competitors. See Mark Lemley 
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interest when weighed against corporate assertions of trade secrecy, 
we should not address each problem by itself, without a broader 
frame of reference.  Rather, we should strive for approaches that 
work for the consistent benefit of the public interest across the board. 
Our Article aims for that goal. 
 
III.  TRADE SECRECY AND PRICING INFORMATION:  CIVIL 
LITIGATION, REGULATORY DISCLOSURE, AND PROSPECTS FOR 
REFORM 
 
As discussed above, trade secret law is a broad category of 
intellectual property law, and one without the registration or 
examination processes seen in copyright and patent law—processes 
which tend to constrain what can be asserted as potentially 
protectable.  Thus, there is a real risk that an already-broad doctrine 
can be stretched even further, at risk to the public interest.  
 
Claiming price, rebate, and profit margin information as a trade 
secret—especially in the narrow and highly-regulated context in 
which PBMs operate—seems curious, even on a visceral level.  First, 
this sort of information hardly sounds like intellectual property.  It 
is not an idea, and it certainly is not the product of innovation.  The 
pricing in a PBM agreement is not information developed by a 
company to operate its business. Rather, it is a mere deal point 
negotiated between two entities.  Second, the very targets of 
regulation—artificially inflated prices—are claimed as intellectual 
property to avoid disclosure.  Thus, trade secret law is being asserted 
as an offensive weapon to avoid regulation, and to avoid 
responsibility for the public harm created by the supposed “trade 
secret” itself. That, in itself, should raise initial suspicion, given the 
distance between these goals and the notion of allowing a business 
to protect the fruits of ideas and innovations cabined under limiting 
definitions while carrying on its business functions. 
 
It sounds curious because this is not what the policies underlying 
trade secret law are about.  Certainly, litigants claim financial 
information as a trade secret, and companies submit information to 
state and federal regulators under seal.  But price competition is 
quite often open, not hidden—not something traditionally seen as 
“property” that is off-limits to competitors. 
 
In fact, the notion that the mere price of something is a secret might 
come as a surprise to some who have focused on the need to offer 
 
& Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1141-45 (2013). 
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competitive pricing in a well-working market.  As the Fifth Circuit 
commented in 1970, in the context of noting that one should not 
define industrial espionage too broadly, “for our industrial process 
to remain healthy, there must be breathing room for observing a 
competing industrialist. A competitor can and must shop his 
competition for pricing and examine his products. . . .”66  
 
Perhaps because the concept sounds so discordant, few appear to 
have even asked the question:  is cost or pricing information alone, 
without details necessary to ascertain the underlying formulas or 
manufacturing process information, really a trade secret?  Even if it 
were, would it really be the type of trade secret that creates a barrier 
to regulatory disclosure that serves a strong public interest?  Yet 
sweeping past that question avoids issues at the core of trade secret 
jurisprudence. The following section will examine the issue in the 
context of legislative and judicial precedent in trade secret law. 
 
A.  Pricing Information and Trade Secret Law:  Case Law in 
Civil Litigation 
 
Although many cases in civil lawsuits have addressed trade secrecy 
claims over various types of pricing information, none appear to 
have squarely posed the methodological question of whether pricing 
information (in general, or as to specific industries or types of 
transactions) is the type of thing that should receive trade secret 
protection. 
 
On the surface, the elements of proving that a trade secret exists in 
civil litigation are straightforward, but general:  the information 
cannot be generally known to others who could use it, it must be 
secured with reasonable restrictions, it must have economic value to 
competitors as a result of being secrecy, and it cannot be readily 
 
66 See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 
1970). In a variation of the argument, some companies assert that trade secret law 
protects prices because prices give the company an advantage over customers, 
rather than competitors. The assertion is that preventing one customer from 
knowing what another customer has paid gives the company an economic 
advantage over customer. See Caremark Complaint at ¶ 37 (claiming that 
disclosure of the information “would give Caremark’s potential customers an 
advantage over Caremark in subsequent contract negotiations); see also 
Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices:  How Medical 
Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 192 (2009) (describing statements by Guidant 
company spokesperson in the context of medical device litigation and 
commenting that Guidant’s theory “if ultimately accepted by courts, could have 
profound implications not only for the health care market . . . but for every market 
in which the prices paid for goods are subject to contractual negotiations between 
sellers and buyers.”). 
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ascertainable in the sense that it can easily be cobbled together 
within a minimum of time and effort (apart from California, where 
ready ascertainability is a defense to a trade secret claim, not an 
affirmative element to establish a valid claim).67  Astute readers will 
notice that these four elements largely ask the same question, albeit 
in different forms. 
 
Under that general rubric—as well as under the pre-UTSA, six-
factor test from the 1939 Restatement of Torts that is obsolete 
everywhere today except New York—courts have sometimes 
treated pricing information as a trade secret, albeit without 
theoretical analysis,68 and sometimes rejected such claims.  Where 
courts have denied claims that pricing information constituted trade 
secrets, the rulings often turn on factual issues, such as whether the 
information at issue is available from the other side of the 
transaction, or whether it is otherwise available in the given market 
or industry.69  For example, a Kansas case rejected a trade secret 
 
67 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A–B). 
68 E.g., Freedom Med. Inc. v. Whitman, 343 F. Supp. 3d 509, 520 (E.D. Pa. 2018) 
(granting preliminary injunction in part against former employee and finding that 
while “pure pricing information is not protectable because that information is 
known to the consumer,” pricing formulae derived from a range of data such as 
materials, labor, overhead, and profit, are protectable as combination or 
compilation secrets because that “full compilation of pricing information is not 
available from public sources”); MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. 
Supp. 2d 396, 423–24 (E.D. Va. 2004) (split ruling finding in favor of former 
employee against former employees on trade secret claim; finding that a document 
containing a “schedule of discounts” was a trade secret where it was not a 
“standard price list” and was instead an internal document used “to develop price 
quotes for customers”); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1455 
(2002) (finding that “cost and pricing information”—“pricing, profit margins, 
costs of production, pricing concessions, promotional discounts, advertising 
allowances, volume rebates, marketing concessions, payment terms, and rebate 
incentives”— qualified as trade secrets and not generalized industry information 
because it was “unique” to the former employer); Frantz v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 
351, 359 (Nev. 2000) (affirming misappropriation finding against former 
employee and others; although “not every customer and pricing list will be 
protected as a trade secret,” the “customer and pricing information” at issue was 
“extremely confidential, its secrecy was guarded, and it was not readily available 
to others” given the highly specialized nature of the industry); Sigma Chem. Co. 
v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 373–74 (8th Cir, 1986) (affirming judgment enforcing 
non-competition covenant against former employee where, among other things, 
“price” information “was not in the public domain”); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. 
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1257, 1260 (8th Cir. 1985) (vacating preliminary 
injunction against former employee; affirming some but not all findings of trade 
secrecy; rejecting notion that prices of plaintiff’s merchandise constituted trade 
secrets because suppliers “have every incentive” to disclose it “to their 
customers,” but finding that pricing information that “subsumed” items “relating 
to materials, labor, overhead, and profit margin” was protectable). 
69 E.g., CDC Restoration & Constr., LC v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 274 
P.3d 317,  324 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (affirming fact-based finding, in lawsuit 
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claim in pricing information where buyers were able to freely share 
information about how much they paid for services from the seller.70  
 
against former employees, that pricing information was not a trade secret because 
the plaintiff failed to show that the information was “unique or especially 
inventive, such that it could not be readily duplicated by others in the industry.”); 
Progressive Prod., Inc. v. Schwartz, 258 P.3d 969, 978 (Kan. 2011) (affirming 
finding that pricing information was not a trade secret, in lawsuit against former 
employees, where facts showed that customers could freely communication “with 
each other about how much they were paying for certain work.”); Stenstrom 
Petroleum Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Mesch, 874 N.E.2d 959, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (in 
lawsuit against former employee, denying motion for preliminary injunction 
where former employer claimed pricing information such as a profit margin was 
a trade secret where former employee showed that a pricing spreadsheet could be 
reproduced in mere hours as calculations of costs, labor, and the price of materials: 
“[i]n order to prove that a pricing formula constitutes a trade secret, a plaintiff 
must establish that the value of the pricing formula lies in the fact that it is not 
generally known to others who could benefit by using it or that it could not be 
acquired through general skills and knowledge.”); Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v. 
Nardi, No. CV980061967S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1003, *139 (Apr. 20, 
2000) (issuing injunction against former employee to enforce non-competition 
covenant but rejecting trade secret allegation; “pricing information” can qualify 
for trade secret protection, but whether that is so depends on facts; where 
plaintiff’s witness testified that pricing is “important and highly confidential,” 
court asked “[b]ut why is this so?  In this highly competitive industry why would 
not pricing information be readily available from prospective customers?  One 
would think they would be falling over each other letting the adjustment 
companies know the pricing of competitors to get the best deal for 
themselves[.]”); Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Brantjes, 891 F. Supp. 432, 
439 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against former 
shareholder where, among other things, the factual context showed that a price 
list was not a trade secret where the price information at issue was widely shared); 
Nat’l Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1993) 
(entering post-trial judgment against plaintiffs on trade secret claim where it 
asserted that a flat 25% discount figure, and funding details on how to meet that 
number, were not protectable trade secrets, finding that how the 25% number was 
“first determined” would be of “no value” to others, and that the other information 
was “freely given out to prospective clients.”); Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591 
A.2d 578, 586 (Md. 1991) (while pricing information can be protectable as a trade 
secret, affirming finding that such information as asserted against a former 
employee was not a trade secret because, in context, it was “subject to change,” 
“subject to market forces,” and “subject to the type of machinery” used and other 
variables, and thus was not “meaningful”); Tyson Metal Prod., Inc. v. McCann, 
546 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. 1988) (reversing injunction where, among other things, 
asserted trade secrets in compiled price list were not protectable because 
competitors could “contact a mutual customer and ask why its bid was rejected in 
favor of” the plaintiff); Agric. Labor Relations Bd. v. Richard A. Glass, Co., 175 
Cal. App. 3d 703, 715 (1985) (in evidentiary dispute in labor relations proceeding, 
reversing administrative ruling barring discovery; holding that party did not 
sustain its burden of showing that cost and price information claimed as trade 
secrets should be withheld from discovery, because the assertions were 
“conclusory and unsupported by evidentiary data.   There is no allegation that this 
information is not a matter of common knowledge among the citrus growers or 
readily obtainable on the open market.”) 
70 See Schwartz, 258 P.3d at 978. 
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And an Illinois court rejected such a claim where the profit margin 
information at issue was easily reproducible.71 
 
At the same time, albeit without much analysis, some courts also 
appear to have questioned whether pricing information is properly 
treated a trade secret.72  Leading treatises likewise indicate some 
degree of hesitation, without specific focus on the questions raised 
here.73  
 
That courts in the midst of civil lawsuits have not spent much time 
analyzing the question of whether pricing information should 
constitute a trade secret is not a surprise.  Trial courts tend to 
consider the arguments that litigants raise, rather than to engage in 
sua sponte analysis of theoretical issues.  In lawsuits between 
 
71 See Mesch, 874 N.E.2d at 974. 
72 E.g., Advantor Sys. Corp. v. DRS Tech. Servs., 678 Fed. Appx. 839, 854 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (affirming summary judgment for defense in part; claimed trade secret 
in “lump-sum price quote” from a “subcontractor proposal” was not a trade secret 
because it lacked independent economic value outside of its specific context of 
being offered in a negotiation); Loparex, LLC v.  MPI Release Tech., LLC, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32371, *20 n.7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2011) (granting defense 
motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s generic descriptions of alleged 
trade secrets; also finding that a profit margin was not something that could be a 
trade secret); Square D Co. v. Van Handel, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21480, *23 
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005) (in a lawsuit against a former employee, finding that 
under Wisconsin law “it is unlikely that a company’s pricing information will be 
found entitled to trade secret protection except in extraordinary cases”; noting that 
customers are free to disclose such information for to foster competition among 
suppliers, and finding that treating price information as a trade secret would 
amount to a virtual non-competition covenant restricting sales employees who 
join a competing firm: “Price lists are not, as a matter of law, protected as trade 
secrets.”); IKON Office Sols., Inc. v. Am. Office Prods., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 
1154, 1169–1170 (D. Or. 2001) (granting summary judgment to former 
employees on trade secret claim that included conclusory allegation that “pricing 
information” was a trade secret; court expressed a concern that claiming general 
business information as trade secrets could lead to the equivalent of a permanent 
non-competition covenant); Amarr Co., Inc. v. Depew, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
660, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1996) (reversing judgment against former 
employee; in factual context where “price lists were readily available to any 
purchaser who was comparing prices between competitors, and the price lists 
were tracked by all competitors,” the court noted that “[w]e also do not see how 
a profit and loss statement can be a ‘trade secret’ that gives an unfair advantage.”). 
73 See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 4.02[2], 4–14 & n.17 (“Pricing information 
may include historical cost data used in formulating bids . . . .  However, it is the 
data that is protectable; typically methods of pricing and estimating are not.”); 
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.09[8][b] (2018) (as to cost 
and pricing, “[a]lthough there are somewhat more cases recognizing that such 
information may constitute a trade secret, there are also a substantial number of 
cases that decide the other way.  This does not imply that authority is divided.  
Rather, it simply suggests that facts presented in some cases have been sufficiently 
secret to permit relief and, in other cases, not.”). 
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companies, litigators may be unlikely to tackle that sort of question, 
either because it is too complex and risky when a fact-based defense 
may suffice, or because law firms may be loath to take positions that 
corporate clients may oppose.  Moreover, the type of public interest 
at stake in regulatory disclosure cases is generally not at issue in a 
civil lawsuit, so that absent factor does not spur a more 
thoroughgoing approach.  Moreover, only a few such cases reached 
appellate or state supreme courts, and it does not appear that litigants 
in such courts presented more theoretical questions for review.  Thus, 
the question is ripe for the type of in-depth theoretical analysis that 
appellate courts can provide when fully presented with the issue. 
 
B.  Case Law in Government Disclosure Cases under FOIA and 
the Trade Secrets Act 
 
An entirely different body of case law has involved allegations that 
pricing information constitutes protectable information.  Once again, 
the decisions yield mixed results.  However, this body of law does 
not focus on whether pricing is, in fact, a trade secret in the manner 
defined by the Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts, because it 
centers on a different statute with older language. 
 
This line of cases comes from efforts by litigants to use the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) and the related Trade Secrets Act74 to 
obtain information about bid pricing and contract pricing between 
private companies and government entities—or to block its 
release. 75   In some cases, disappointed bidders or would-be 
competitors are the parties seeking the disclosure of such 
information. 
As noted, this is a different statute, and a different context, than is 
seen in disputes between state regulators and industry where the 
definition of a trade secret is governed by the Federal Act and the 
state Uniform Trade Secret Act.  We offer this case law and 
literature review concerning disputes over pricing information under 
 
74 The Trade Secrets Act is not the DTSA, but an older, narrower federal statute 
governing release of information somewhat akin to the FOIA, but also with civil 
penalties and imprisonment as potential penalties for government employees who 
engage in unauthorized release of trade secrets.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1905. 
75 On the general subject of adjudicating potential government disclosures of 
trade secrets through FOIA and other types of publication, the most thorough 
treatment is Elizabeth Rowe, Striking a Balance:  When Should Trade-Secret Law 
Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 794 (2011) 
(focusing on “refusal to submit” situations where companies avoid submission of 
data to government entities, outlining various federal statutes and agencies in play, 
and advocating an approach analogous to the discovery of trade secrets in civil, 
non-misappropriation lawsuits where a party seeks such evidence and faces 
objections from the information-holder). 
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the FOIA, however, because it is part of the historical backdrop, and 
because it further demonstrates the inconsistent ways courts have 
analyzed pricing information.  This discussion comes with a major 
caveat:  The FOIA is an older, 1960s-era statute and its text refers 
to both “trade secrets” and “confidential” information.  Courts 
considering FOIA actions have focused on the latter in rulings on 
pricing information.  However, that language is inconsistent with the 
contemporary UTSA/DTSA framework, which does not envision a 
two-tier regime of “trade secret” and “confidential” business 
information.  It is also confusing given recent debates in the civil 
litigation context, discussed in detail below, regarding Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act preemption of state law tort claims said to protect 
“confidential” information.  Thus, while conceptions of 
“confidential” information are of dubious logical validity in current 
theory and pose clear dangers to public policy in broader trade secret 
contexts, that is nevertheless the statutory framework in which the 
FOIA disputes over pricing information have been litigated.  We 
therefore do not offer the logic of FOIA decisions as a model for the 
proposals we offer regarding naked price and trade secrecy in the 
PBM pharmaceutical pricing arena.  We merely present this history 
for completeness, for potential analogies, and for its shortcomings. 
 
 Indeed, a reader of civil trade secret disputes will immediately 
notice a major difference between this FOIA line of cases addressing 
statutory language from 1966 about confidentiality and civil 
litigation rulings which analyze whether a trade secret exists.  For 
several decades, and until a June 2019 Supreme Court ruling altered 
the analysis, courts evaluating potential FOIA disclosures applied 
the following two-part test: information an entity is required to 
submit to the government “will be considered confidential only if 
disclosure would be likely either (1) to impair the government’s 
ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause 
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from 
whom the information was obtained.”76  As discussed below, many 
FOIA rulings focused entirely on the second factor.  Under neither 
factor is a reviewing court tasked with focusing on whether any 
given item of information is, in fact, a trade secret.  Indeed, as 
discussed, below, even the recent Supreme Court ruling was not 
confronted with that question and did not approach it. 
 
As we will describe below, these cases demonstrate that, in a 
potentially analogous regulatory disclosure context, courts have 
 
76 E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303, 304-05 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (applying 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) and stating that FOIA does not apply to 
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from 
a person and privileged or confidential.”). 
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avoided a full-on analysis of whether pricing information, in context, 
truly constitutes a trade secret, in large part because they focus on 
different statutory text and not the definition of a trade secret for 
FOIA purposes.  Indeed, compared to civil trade secret litigation, 
these cases have mostly avoided any analysis of trade secrecy from 
an intellectual property perspective, and have instead rendered 
rulings based on how strong the contractor’s arguments are 
regarding the competitive harm it would suffer should the pricing 
information be publicly disclosed.  That focus substantially 
increases the chance that a court denies disclosure, without 
separating harm that results from a loss of valid intellectual property 
from the harm that occurs naturally in the business world as rivals 
use unprotectable information to compete with one another. 
 
Two studies have shown that courts reviewing such requests have, 
in part, shifted ground towards nondisclosure.  In a comprehensive 
2002 article, Gregory McClure demonstrated that, in the 1980s and 
90s, courts generally leaned toward disclosure of such pricing 
information, 77 with one court notably stating that “the idea that a 
price charged to the government for specific goods or services could 
be a ‘trade secret’ appears passing strange to us[.]”78  In particular, 
the D.C. and Ninth Circuits have issued rulings permitting the 
release of pricing information over objections from companies 
which had won bids or contracts.79    In one 1997 decision, for 
 
77 See Gregory H. McClure, The Treatment of Contract Prices Under the Trade 
Secrets Act and the Freedom of Information Act Exemption 4:  Are Contract 
Prices Really Trade Secrets?, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 185, 196–216 (2002) 
(comprehensive article collecting case law and advocating disclosure of pricing 
information; “[t]he vast majority of cases have held that unit prices are releasable, 
whether under the trade secret or competitive harm tests[.]). 
78 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(remanding to trial court to require further information from the Air Force 
regarding a pricing disclosure sought under the FOIA). 
79 E.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Dalton, 974 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1997) 
(granting motion for summary judgment by the Navy to release information from 
military contracts that included allegedly confidential “cost and fee information, 
including material, labor, and overhead costs, as well as target costs, target profits, 
and fixed fees,” and other unit pricing data; rejecting contractor’s argument that 
it would suffer competitive harm, because the contractor will continue bidding for 
future contracts; “[contractor] might prefer that less be known about its 
operations, and that the reasons for its operations for it past successes remain a 
mystery to be solved by the competitors on their own.  But it has not shown [Navy] 
or this Court, on the basis of this record, that it will in fact be unable to duplicate 
those successes unless [Navy] acquiesces in keeping the competition in the 
dark.”); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 
1994) (reversing agency and requiring release of “percentage and dollar amounts” 
paid to government subcontractors, reasoning that “we believe the FOIA’s strong 
presumption in favor of disclosure trumps the contractors’ right to privacy.  Those 
seeking to prevent the disclosure of certain information under FOIA have the 
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example, the district court for the District of Columbia sharply 
criticized the motion that a military contractor should be able to 
withhold pricing information from its competitors:  “[contractor] 
might prefer that less be known about its operations, and that the 
reasons for its past successes remain a mystery to be solved by the 
competitors on their own.  But it has not shown [the Navy] or this 
Court, on the basis of this record, that it will in fact be unable to 
duplicate those successes unless [the Navy] acquiesces in keeping 
the competition in the dark.”80   
 
However, these decisions did not directly analyze whether the 
pricing information at issue was, in fact, a trade secret, and largely 
did not attempt to define the meaning of confidentiality under the 
FOIA either.  Following the FOIA two-part test described above, 
they instead focused on the distinct question of whether disclosure 
of the information at issue would harm the party opposing 
publication in marketplace competition. 81   As discussed further 
below, whether information is intellectual property and whether a 
party will suffer harm from competitors are not the same thing.   
 
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit began shielding pricing information 
from public disclosure in some decisions by the 1990s.82  Indeed, as 
 
burden of proving that the information is confidential.  It is questionable whether 
the declarations submitted by the three contractors show any potential for 
competitive harm, let alone substantial harm.”) (emphasis in original); Pacific 
Architects & Eng., Inc. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1345, 1347–48 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(affirming ruling to release a contract to provide maintenance services to the 
government, which included a “unit rate price,” on the theory that a competitor 
would not be able to figure out the profit margin given the “number of fluctuating 
variables” that go into such a calculation); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. 
Dep’t of the Air Force, 781 F. Supp. 31, 32–33 (D.D.C. 1991) (in mixed ruling, 
requiring release of “modified unit prices” in contract between AT&T and the Air 
Force where “multiplier” information would be hard to ascertain without knowing 
“a great deal about labor costs,” and thus fears of harm were too “speculative”); 
see also Acumenics Research & Tech. v. United States, 843 F.2d 800, 807–08 
(4th Cir. 1988) (finding that FOIA and Trade Secrets Act are “coextensive” as to 
exemptions allowing disclosure and, in case where party sought release of pricing 
information relating to a government contract, affirming release on ground that 
“there are too many unascertainable variables in the unit price calculation” for a 
competitor to figure out the contractor’s “multiplier,” and thus competitive harm 
was not established); J.H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith, 545 F. Supp. 421, 424–25 (D. 
Md. 1982) (finding triable fact issues as to whether unit pricing information with 
NASA should be disclosed under FOIA and the Trade Secrets Act; denying 
motion for summary judgment aiming to block such disclosure because 
contracting party had not established competitive harm; “[t]he item prices does 
not actually reveal the plaintiff’s underlying profit or overhead data.”). 
80 See Martin Marietta Corp., 974 F. Supp. at 40. 
81 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.                
82 E.g., MCI Worldcom, Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 163 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35–36 
(D.D.C. 2001) (granting contractor’s motion for summary judgment to block 
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David Allen Dulaney has shown, that Circuit shifted strongly away 
from such disclosures in the wake of in a 2003 decision, McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation v. United States Department of the Air 
Force.83  In that case, the D.C Circuit reversed a trial court decision 
to allow publication of option year pricing and vendor pricing 
information, though it permitted disclosure of information about 
labor rates.84  It rejected several arguments from the Air Force in 
favor of publication—namely, that the actual, adjusted prices would 
not be released, making it harder for competitors to underbid, and 
that factors other than price play into contracting decisions.85  The 
court accepted the premise that the contractor would suffer 
substantial competitive harm if such information were released, in 
that the threat of being underbid constituted such harm.86  Again, 
however, the court did not squarely address whether such pricing 
information constituted a trade secret.  Other, similar decisions 
followed.87 That failure glossed over a serious analytical deficit. As 
 
disclosure of pricing data for the remaining years of telecommunications services 
contracts; “this Circuit has held that line-item pricing...is exactly the type of 
information that constitutes ‘confidential commercial or financial information’ 
and is not disclosable in response to a FOIA request”; contractor showed 
competitive harm by arguing that disclosure would lead to underbidding in the 
future); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303, 306–07 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (reversing district court decision to release line item pricing information in 
contract because agency was “illogical” in denying contractor’s competitive harm 
argument; finding that agency’s reasoning was “silly” and “illogical” in asserting 
that release of such information would not lead to underbidding as price is only 
one factor, and that the real competitive harm was to other bidders who lack such 
information); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. O’Leary, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2586, *13–15 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1999) (remanding Department of Energy’s 
decision to release unit pricing information where agency’s “factfinding and 
analysis appear to be wanting” as to potential competitive harm to be suffered by 
contractor, which submitted evidence alleging that a competitor would receive 
“an unfair advance look” before the next “rebid”). 
83 375 F.3d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also David Allen Dulaney, Where’s the 
Harm?  Release Unit Prices in Awarded Contracts Under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 2010 ARMY LAW. 37, 37–38 (2010) (“[O]ver the last decade, 
government-friendly decisions by the Court of Appeal for the District of 
Columbia . . . have virtually ensured that taxpayers cannot find out the amount the 
government is paying for an individual unit of good or service”; arguing that 
disclosure serves the public interest and contrasting these cases with a more open 
process in the United Kingdom). 
84 See McDonnell Douglas, 375 F.3d at 1187–90. 
85 See id. at 1188–90. 
86 See id.  
87 E.g., Canadian Comm. Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 514 F.3d 37, 41–42 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming trial court ruling barring release of line item pricing 
information in military contract because disclosure would cause substantial 
competitive harm to contractors; “[b]eyond a general paean to the benefits of 
public disclosure, therefore, the Air Force has given us nary a reason to believe 
pricing information that, if disclosed, would work a substantial competitive harm, 
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noted in Section II above, trade secret is not a pure competition 
suppressing vehicle. Thus, the simple fear of being underbid—
which translates into the fear of facing competition—is not 
something trade secret protects against. One who is underbid in a 
situation where the information used does not actually constitute a 
trade secret has no recourse. 
 
A June 2019 Supreme Court ruling altered the test for FOIA records 
disclosures by eliminating the “substantial competitive harm” factor 
we have criticized above.88   However, the case did not concern 
pricing information or the definition of a trade secret under the FOIA 
exceptions, and the court was not presented with an opportunity to 
define what types of information constitutes a trade secret for FOIA 
purposes and did not endeavor to do so.89  Indeed, the case illustrates 
how courts facing FOIA disputes fail to carefully analyze latent 
questions about what is truly protectable and what is not.   
 
In Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, journalists 
sought access to annual food stamp redemption data on a per-
grocery store basis over a period of several years. 90   A trade 
association resisted disclosure, arguing that groceries would suffer 
competitive harm if competitors knew the details of food stamp 
redemptions, in that they purportedly would better know where to 
locate new stores.91   Ultimately, the court rejected the two-part 
 
should nonetheless be categorically excluded from [FOIA] Exemption 4.”); Essex 
Electro Eng., Inc. v. U.S. Sec’y of the Army, 686 F. Supp. 2d 91, 93–94 (D.D.C. 
2010) (granting summary judgment in favor of the Army against disclosure of 
unit prices in contract; even though contractor’s argument about future harm was 
“highly speculative because unit prices are based on multiple factors,” that 
sufficed to show substantial competitive harm); Morales v. Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *17 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2012) (granting 
summary judgment in favor of government entity and against disclosure of option 
year pricing information because such disclosure “would give competitors of the 
present contractors leverage with which to persuade PBGC to open the contracts 
for bidding or renegotiation with others rather than exercise its current option”). 
88 See Food Mrktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019). 
89 It is important to stress that Argus did not address the meaning of “trade secret” 
under the FOIA.  In any event, as Sharon Sandeen has noted, Congress may need 
to overhaul the statute, as it reflects language from 1966 that is outdated given the 
DTSA’s definition of trade secrecy.  See Sharon Sandeen, High Court FOIA 
Ruling Has Trade Secrets Implications, LAW 360 (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1175163/high-court-foia-ruling-has-trade-
secrets-implications (“But the need for greater clarity and certainty is not the only 
reason Congress should provide a legislative fix.  One is needed because a lot has 
happened since 1966 concerning our conceptions of privacy and secrecy, 
including the adoption of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, which provides 
a definition of ‘trade secret’ that has become the international norm.”). 
90 See Argus, 139 S. Ct. at 2361. 
91 See id. 
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FOIA test because its second element (substantial competitive harm) 
was not rooted in the FOIA’s text.92  The Court instead focused on 
whether the information at issue was confidential.  In doing so, the 
Court did not seek to define the term “trade secret” in the FOIA, and 
did not treat the case as one involving intellectual property.  
Somewhat oddly, the Court defined confidential information as that 
which the owner customarily treats as private—without asking what 
would happen if someone treated as private something that was 
either publicly available, or otherwise did not meet the criteria for 
trade secret protection.93  To be sure, the data at issue may well have 
qualified for trade secret protection—none of the parties appear to 
have analyzed that question—and questions of protectability thus 
may await a dispute over more questionable types of information.  
In any event, Argus Leader did nothing to clarify when information 
qualifies as a “trade secret” for FOIA disputes and when it does not.  
The ruling may well confuse such matters because it considered only 
whether a party treated information as confidential, which is hardly 
dispositive of protectability from an intellectual property standpoint.  
This decision, as with our FOIA discussion overall, does not affect 
our critique of naked price in trade secret disputes between state 
regulators and industry under the Federal Act and state Uniform 
Acts, because it deals exclusively with the FOIA’s older 
“confidential” terminology and does not purport to address the 
protection of pricing information under a contemporary trade secret 
regime. 
 
In open records disputes, the situation is similarly mixed in state 
courts where open records statutes and regulatory disclosures are at 
issue.  Courts often rule against disclosure on the ground that pricing 
information is a trade secret, but do not squarely address the 
question.  Many reach their ruling based on complaints by the 
contractor that it will face price competition in the market if the 
information were disclosed.94  Notably, however, in a case involving 
 
92 See id. at 2365. 
93 See id. at 2363-65. 
94 E.g., State ex rel. Luken v. Corp. for Findlay Mkt. of Cincinnati, 988 N.E.2d 
546, 551–52 (Ohio 2013) (Where party sought records filed with a government 
agency that included rental rates in a market, court considered Uniform Act 
factors and also described the six-factor Restatement test to find that the 
information was a trade secret and thus not subject to disclosure; court considered 
argument that disclosure would cause tenants to “compare notes” and thus cause 
a “competitive disadvantage” but did not inquire whether such rates were the type 
of thing that should be a trade secret in the first place); Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. 
v. Abbott, 406 S.W.3d 626, 629, 632 (Tex. App. 2013) (same, as to pricing 
information in waste disposal records); Gannett River States Pub. Co. v. Entergy 
Miss., Inc., 940 So.2d 221, 225–26 (Miss. 2006) (where publisher sought rate 
information that a utility charged a third party for electrical services, affirming 
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commodity rates, the North Dakota high court found that pricing 
information constituted a trade secret, but nonetheless held that it 
was subject to regulatory disclosure given the public interest at 
stake—the “legitimate governmental interest of policing 
irregularities in the handling of public matters affecting the rates 
paid by citizens for an essential commodity in this state.”95 
 
Even though the FOIA is a different regime and disputes under it 
arise in a different context, these cases show us that, in a potentially 
analogous regulatory disclosure context, courts here, too, have 
avoided a full-on analysis of whether pricing information, in context, 
is truly protectable information, much less a “trade secret” under the 
FOIA exemptions.  That type of analysis is deficient for the broader 
questions about PBM pricing that we raise, for the simple reason 
that suffering competitive harm does not establish that intellectual 
property exists.  As noted at the outset, for example, if an ex-
employee starts a competing business using general knowledge and 
training to entice customers away, the former company may have 
suffered competitive harm, but the information used to inflict that 
harm cannot be propertized and does not constitute a trade secret.96  
Similarly, if pricing information does not constitute a trade secret, 
the harm a contracting party might suffer from regulatory disclosure 
does not, in and of itself, establish that intellectual property rights 
exist.97 
 
 
nondisclosure where court treated evidence of harm as conclusive of 
confidentiality; “Energy produced substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence 
that disclosing the information . . . would compromise Energy’s ability to offer 
competitive prices to other large users, cripple its ability to negotiate with existing 
and new customers, and jeopardize Energy’s ability to use lucrative high-volume 
user contracts to keep the rates of smaller users lower.”); Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Mo. Dep’t of Ins., 169 S.W.3d 905, 910–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (where 
public interest group sought disclosure of insurance premium information that had 
been provided to government agency, affirming nondisclosure, applying 
Restatement of Torts factors (but not Comment b) to find trade secrecy but 
without directly asking if pricing information could be a trade secret; focusing on 
idea that information had independent economic value and finding that 
declarations about competitive harm should other insurers see the information and 
“adjust their pricing to become more competitive”). 
95 See N. States Power Co. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm., 502 N.W.2d 240, 247 (N.D. 
1993) (affirming disclosure of price and volume data in natural gas contracts). 
96  See supra note 58 (example of unprotectable employee general skill, 
knowledge, and experience).  
97  Absent some unlawful act like fraud, underbidding a business rival is not 
wrongful.  See generally Charles C. Chapman Bldg. Co. v. Cal. Mart, 2 Cal. App. 
3d 846, 857 (1969) (collecting authorities; noting that “price reduction” is 
“generally a lawful method of competition”).  It is important to highlight that 
many arguments seeking to treat prices as trade secrets are no more than an effort 
to evade this longstanding principle.  
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C.  Is Naked Price Really a Trade Secret? 
 
We now reach the question that courts in civil litigation and in FOIA 
disputes have skirted or have not addressed at all:  is pricing 
information, especially in the context of agreements between major 
Pharmacy Benefit Managers and pharmaceutical companies, a trade 
secret in the first place, particularly when weighed against a strong 
public interest? 
 
To be sure, there is something awkward about claiming pricing 
information—whether a raw price, a profit margin, or related 
details—as one company’s intellectual property.  In a market 
economy, price competition is the norm.  A competitor with a better 
bid does not steal intellectual property from a rival that offers a 
higher price, even if it consciously tries to underbid that price 
point—it instead offers similar goods and services, presumably of 
its own design, at a rate more desirable to the buyer.  The buyer 
makes the choice, not the seller, so the notion that the price belongs 
to the seller seems off-base for that reason as well.  And a price is 
hardly the same thing as the underlying design, development, or 
product being bought and sold—the information that is the normal 
candidate for trade secret protection.  
 
Indeed, the idea that pricing information should qualify for trade 
secret protection does not fit a traditional justification for 
intellectual property laws:  to encourage and incentivize spending 
and research to develop useful commercial information.  No 
incentive is needed to encourage companies to buy low and sell high, 
for that is the ordinary function of the market, and the generation of 
a price itself is not the same thing as the generation of the 
information to be sold (or licensed, as the case may be).  Moreover, 
in the narrow PBM context where price gouging has emerged as a 
serious policy concern, the abstract argument that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers would not be incentivized to spend on drug 
development absent the ability to suppress such pricing seems 
dubious, and the burden should be on the proponent of such an 
argument to demonstrate why a hypothetical decrease in research 
not only would come true, but would outweigh the consumer benefit 
from lower prices for existing pharmaceutical products. And of 
course, markets generally seem to be able to create perfectly 
adequate innovation incentives without resorting to hidden prices. 
 
The trade secret statutes do not explicitly mention pricing 
information among their illustrative lists of information that can 
qualify as a trade secret.  The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, for 
example, states that such information includes “all forms and types 
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of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering 
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program 
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, 
processes, procedures, programs, or codes[.]” 98   Delaware’s 
enactment of the earlier version of the state Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act and California’s enactment of the later version both list “a 
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, 
or process[.]”99  The absence of a specific type of information from 
these general categories, however, does not mean that the omitted 
information cannot constitute a trade secret.  But with no specific 
mention of naked prices, the issue remains an open question.  And, 
as described above, merely labeling something as confidential in a 
nondisclosure agreement does not fill the gap and transform 
information into a trade secret.100 
 
Moreover, if others in the same market reach similar pricing 
arrangements for similar contracts, it is not clear that pricing could 
constitute a trade secret for an altogether different reason:  if the 
relevant market participants are reaching the same or similar 
outcomes independently of one another, such information may be 
generally known to those in the trade, and thus not a trade secret 
even if all of them treat it as such.101  Trade secret law, after all, is 
not a monopoly, and if two different companies come up with the 
same information independently and nobody publishes it, 
theoretically both own the same trade secret—though neither knows 
that the other also has rights in the same information.  And, if not 
two but all or almost all relevant players in a market come up with 
the same information, there is no trade secret at all.  That is why the 
federal Defend Trade Secrets Act provides that independent 
development is not, itself, misappropriation,102  just as state law 
courts have also held for many years.103 Thus, it is also possible that 
 
98 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3).  To be sure, financial information is a broad and ill-
defined category, but it seems more attuned to information that falls within normal 
trade secret coverage, such as (for example) research and development costs for a 
specific type of laboratory testing.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.461 (listing “cost 
data” among examples of protectable information in Oregon’s version of the 
Uniform Act).  A price is not the same thing. 
99 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2001(4); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d). 
100 See supra note 51. 
101 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (information is not a trade secret if it is 
generally known by those who can benefit from it); CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3426.1(d)(1) (same). 
102  See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (“independent derivation” is not “improper 
means”). 
103 California is the only UTSA jurisdiction to embed the concept of independent 
derivation into its statute, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a), but courts applying 
state law in other jurisdictions have uniformly protected a defendant’s 
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if the handful of major PBMs reach very similar pricing 
arrangements with health care plans, the basic definition of trade 
secrecy may further limit protection. 
 
Beyond these observations, however, is the question of whether 
transaction-specific prices that change over time and are subject to 
renegotiation truly fall within the class of information that can ever 
constitute a trade secret—in particular, in the highly-regulated 
pharmaceutical industry.   
 
1.  Existing Arguments Against Pricing as Trade Secrets 
 
By far the most sophisticated approach to this question is by 
Annemarie Bridy in 2009.  Based on experience litigating on behalf 
of a non-profit with medical device manufacturers over whether 
pricing information in contracts constituted a trade secret, she argues 
that medical device pricing is not a trade secret and that propertizing 
it as such “might contribute to the unsustainably rising cost of health 
care.”104 
 
Bridy’s argument is complex.  She questions whether trade secret 
law is best constituted as a theory of property rights at all, rather 
than relational theory (an approach that foregrounds duties among 
contracting parties and is less interested in defining and testing the 
validity of specific information claimed as intellectual property).105  
Similarly, she asserts the existence of a class of information that is 
not a trade secret, but merely “confidential business information of 
a non-trade secret nature.” 106  Unfortunately, these initial 
philosophical moves would destabilize the concept that trade secret 
law is unitary and thus encompasses business information said to be 
“confidential” under common standards.  As discussed below, these 
subtle theoretical expressions of theory pose dangers for promoting 
 
independent development of the same, non-public information as well.  E.g., 
Moore v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 318 F.3d 561, 572 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the plaintiff in a trade secret case bears the ultimate burden to prove that 
defendant did not independently derive its own information); Ahlert v. Hasbro, 
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 509, 515 (D.N.J. 2004) (example of independent derivation 
where defendant presented records of independent development of toy gun 
design). 
104 See Bridy, supra note 66, at 188.  Bridy has also advocated for the legislative 
solution of enacting rules barring certain types of confidentiality agreements for 
medical device pricing.  See JAMES C. ROBINSON & ANNEMARIE BRIDY, 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND TRANSPARENCY FOR MEDICAL DEVICE PRICES:  MARKET 
DYNAMICS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES (Berkeley Ctr. for Health Tech. Oct. 
2009), https://bcht.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/device-prices-transparency-
report.pdf. 
105 See Bridy, supra note 66, at 193–94. 
106 See id. at 203. 
 100 
the public interest in trade secrecy disputes, including 
pharmaceutical pricing. 
 
That said, having proposed these lines of approach, Bridy’s primary 
argument centers on revitalizing an insight from the 1939 
Restatement of Torts, which provided the basis for civil trade secret 
law before the states gradually adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act beginning in 1979.  As she notes, trade secret cases early in the 
twentieth century often excluded “ordinary, private commercial 
information” from trade secret protection.107  As a result, comment 
B to Section 757 of the Restatement stated that trade secret 
protection should not extend to “information as to single or 
ephemeral events in the conduct of a business,” including “the 
amount of other items of a secret bid.”  Rather, trade secret 
protection was to be limited to “a process or device for continuous 
use in the operation of the business.”108  Thus, Bridy notes that trade 
secrets were to be “durable information on which the business 
runs.”109 
 
Of course, the state law versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
superseded the 1939 Restatement—except in New York, the last 
holdout as of this writing.110 In superseding the Restatement, the 
Uniform Act explicitly rejected the limitation that only information 
in “continuous use” could constitute a trade secret.  The official 
commentary to the 1985 version of the Uniform Act, for example, 
states that the Act’s “definition of ‘trade secret’ contains a 
reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition 
which required that a trade secret be ‘continuously used in one’s 
business.’  The broader definition in the proposed Act extends 
protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or 
acquired the means to put a trade secret to use.”111  That change 
made sense, because the “continuous use” restriction meant that a 
company’s ongoing research and development efforts, or novel 
 
107 See id. at 197. 
108 See id. at 198 (discussing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. B (1939)). 
109 See id.  
110 Notably, New York still maintains the rule that trade secrecy does not extend 
to ephemeral events such as single financial transactions.  E.g., Bear, Stearns 
Funding, Inc. v. Interface Group-Nev., Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 283, 305–06 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that financial and loan information from single, past 
transaction did not meet the continuous use requirement and citing Lehman v. 
Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2nd Cir. 1986) for the similar proposition 
that ephemeral information about a third party’s potential availability for a deal, 
and the attractiveness of that potential deal was did not meet continuous use 
requirement). 
111 See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1, cmt. (NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1986). 
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ideas not yet put to practice, would not receive trade secret 
protection if someone were to misappropriate such information.112  
 
Thus, the Uniform Act and its comments did not repeat the 
Restatement’s language about transitory or ephemeral information 
not qualifying for trade secret protection, but the Uniform Act’s 
logic was aimed at a different issue.113  Bridy therefore argues that 
the drafters of the Uniform Act, in doing away with the continuous 
use requirement, but also the rest of Comment b by silent omission, 
only inadvertently left open the possibility that pricing information 
could be a trade secret under the UTSA. 114   Omitting that 
requirement, she argues, has nothing to do with rendering 
“transaction specific sales price information” into a trade secret.115  
She notes that many courts still occasionally cited the Restatement 
even after the local jurisdiction had adopted the Uniform Act, and 
that—at least on the facts—courts have often rejected trade secret 
claims based on pricing information.116  
 
Ultimately, Bridy argues that courts should consider the Uniform 
Act’s removal of the continuous use requirement in context, and not 
assume that the removal of that requirement necessarily meant that 
the remainder of the Restatement’s Comment b as to ephemeral, 
transaction-specific information was thereby also to fall within the 
ambit of trade secret protection.  She finds no intent, on the part of 
the Uniform Act’s drafters, to turn pricing information into trade 
secrets.117   
 
The State of California made a similar, though truncated, argument 
when opposing Amgen’s motion for a preliminary injunction against 
 
112  More controversially, this UTSA comment also states that “negative” 
information can receive protection.  See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 2.03[2] 
(2017) (noting change from Restatement).  This concept is vague and difficult to 
define, and may pose public policy concerns as to the rights of departing 
employees.  E.g., Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge:  A Critique, 15 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387 (2007).  In other words, the UTSA’s attempt to 
correct a portion of the Restatement created its own set of nettlesome ambiguities. 
113 Jim Pooley argues that this omission means that the UTSA does, in fact, 
recognize ephemeral information because it is “considerably broader” than the 
Restatement.  See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 2.03[2][a] (2017) (“Under the 
modern formation reflected in the Uniform Act, bid information is protected.”). 
114 See Bridy, supra note 66 at 200 (“Although the drafters of the UTSA did not 
mean to bring ephemeral business information within the scope of trade secrecy 
when they eliminated the requirement of continuous use from the statutory 
definition, such has been the unintended consequence of the modification, at least 
in some jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA.”). 
115 See id. at 199. 
116 See id. at 201–02. 
117 See id. at 207–08. 
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the publication of upcoming changes in drug pricing in 2019.  It 
argued both a factual issue— that the information at issue had 
already been disclosed to “nearly 200 private and public purchases 
and PBMs who are under no obligation to preserve [Amgen’s] 
confidentiality”—as well as the definitional issue. Specifically, the 
state argued that, (1) information merely about estimating pricing is 
not a trade secret at all; and (2) as with Bridy’s analysis, information 
about single or ephemeral events is not a trade secret at all.118  Thus, 
these types of arguments are very much part of the landscape in 
current regulatory disclosure disputes. 
 
McClure and Dulaney, discussed above in the context of FOIA case 
law, also seem to take a similar approach.  McClure, in advocating 
that pricing information in government contracts should be 
disclosed in FOIA and Trade Secrets Act disputes, argues that “the 
definition of a trade secret from the Restatement of Torts should be 
applied for non-FOIA cases.”119  Dulaney, by contrast, does not 
make an IP-based argument when proposing that the public interest 
should prevail in FOIA and other disputes over the publication of 
pricing information in government contracts, but his arguments are 
congruent with a concept that such information is transitory and not 
deserving of trade secret protection in that context.120  
 
 
2.  Fine-Tuning the Critique 
 
Bridy, McClure, and Dulaney offer important insights into why 
pricing information in the context of Pharmacy Benefit Manager 
agreements with pharmaceutical companies should not receive trade 
secret protection against regulatory disclosure in the public interest.  
At the same time, their analyses can be strengthened to better fit 
today’s environment, where the Federal Act has been enacted and 
some version of the Uniform Act is now law in almost every state.121 
 
118 See Respondent’s Notice at 20-21, Amgen Inc. v. Cal. Corr. Health Serv., No. 
18-stcp-03147 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019). Unfortunately, the state’s argument 
was short and buried deep within its brief.  It also relied on older, pre-UTSA case 
law under the Restatement, when trade secrets had to be in continuous use.  See 
id. (citing Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 207 (1971) (requiring disclosure 
of pesticide-related information because it was not in continuous use under then 
then-controlling standard).  As discussed here, the thrust of the State’s argument 
is entirely correct, and need not rely on such older case law. 
119 See McClure, supra note 77, at 217.  McClure notes Comment b as well.  See 
id. at 214. 
120 See Dulaney, supra note 83, at 37, 49 (arguing for “a balancing test that 
incorporates the public interest”). 
121 Massachusetts became the latest state to adopt a version of the UTSA in 
October 2018.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42–42G.   Although Alabama and 
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To begin with, we need not seek to destabilize trade secret law as a 
form of property rights in order to argue that pricing information is 
not a trade secret in the pharmacy benefit context.  That is 
unnecessarily swinging a broad hammer against a very narrow nail.  
Moreover, it could have unintended negative consequences.  In 
particular, if we start from the presumption that trade secret law 
should be calibrated to reflect important public policy objectives and 
not merely private commercial interests, there is a significant need 
to strongly uphold trade secret law as a property theory, and not the 
relational theory that the older Restatement would have found 
appropriate.  Specifically, in the common employer/employee 
context, departing employees have more balanced rights in disputes 
brought by their former employers if trade secrets are seen as 
objective, well-defined property rights than in a relational regime 
where trade secrets could be vaguely-defined, amorphous, and 
perhaps even available in the public domain. 122   Indeed, by 
definition a relational theory is significantly more interested in 
whether the defendant was in a trusted relationship with the plaintiff, 
and less so in whether the plaintiff has defined specific items as 
intellectual property that must then be tested for validity.  For that 
reason, a relational theory of trade secret law makes it more difficult 
for courts to focus on whether specific items of information asserted 
to be trade secrets should, in fact, receive such protection.  Under a 
relational approach, those asserting trade secrecy rights are more 
likely to escape scrutiny of overbroad, conclusory claims that broad 
areas of information are protectable.  A property theory focuses 
everyone on whether any discrete item of information truly qualifies 
for protection.   
 
Nor should we seek a short cut through the pricing quandary by 
arguing for the existence of a category of so-called “confidential 
business information” that is not the same thing as a trade secret. 
This is the approach that is latent if one were to lean on the 
Restatement to revitalize its commentary, as well as what the State 
of Nevada expressly argued in a 2017 regulatory disclosure case.123  
 
North Carolina have trade secret statutes that do not entirely match the UTSA, the 
family resemblance is sufficient to treat them as the same, and for purposes of this 
Article the differences among the various statutes do not matter. 
122 These points are detailed extensively, with relevant case law, in Charles Tait 
Graves, Trade Secrets as Property:  Theory and Consequences, 15 GA. J. OF 
INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007). 
123 See Bridy, supra note 66, at 203; see also Nevada Legislature’s Opposition to 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6–7, Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. Oct. 
1, 2017) (“confidential business information that does not rise to the level of a 
trade secret is not entitled to the same level of protection”). 
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Advocating for the creation of a second class of protectable 
information in addition to the official class of trade secrets would 
backfire. It would provide theoretical cover to assert that non-secret 
information should nonetheless receive legal protection as if it were 
a trade secret.  That is, instead of a two-tier, binary distinction 
between protectable information and information that is 
unprotectable and thus usable by all, this concept would create a 
three-tier, or even multi-tier system where an information-holder 
has several bites at the apple to assert some level of protection, even 
for information that is not a trade secret.  That would strengthen the 
hand of the party seeking nondisclosure and weaken the hand of 
those seeking disclosure in the public interest.    
 
Moreover, such an artificial distinction is arbitrary and analytically 
impossible to sustain. For example, what exactly is the difference 
between trade secrets and business information said to be 
“confidential?” 124  There is no history analytically defining a 
defensible line between the two, nor can we imagine one when a 
civil defendant seeks to show that information is in the public 
domain and thus unprotectable.  More important, it runs squarely 
against the state Uniform Act’s preemption doctrine, which is a key 
part of the modern operation of state trade secret law in almost all 
UTSA jurisdictions.  Just as patent law preempts attempts by 
litigants and state legislatures to use state law to relax the 
requirements of the patent laws to assert claims over unpatented 
information, and just as copyright law preempts state law claims 
which likewise seek to assert IP-like protection over information 
that does not meet copyrightability requirements, the Uniform Acts 
which contain a displacement clause seek to prevent litigants who 
assert tort claims such as conversion or unfair competition from 
evading the need to establish trade secrecy.125  In the case of the state 
Uniform Act, a large majority of courts have ruled that state trade 
secret law blocks attempts by civil litigants to use tort law to chase 
 
124 This does not include personal private information of the type that is the 
subject of the privacy laws, rather than the intellectual property laws.  That is what 
our qualifier “business information” means. 
125 See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment, and Patents: The 
Fraud Fallacy, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.J. 30 (2015) (describing issues related 
to federal preemption of state laws in various contexts).  For examples of federal 
patent preemption and federal copyright preemption versus state law, see 
generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) 
(patent preemption of a state statute); Sammons & Sons v. Ladd-Fab, Inc., 138 
Cal. App. 3d 306 (1982) (patent preemption of state law tort claims); Ultraflo 
Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc., 845 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2017) (copyright 
preemption of state law tort claim). 
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departing employees with dubious claims over information said to 
be “confidential but not secret.”126  
 
These rulings have been critical in preventing employers from 
bullying departing employees. Imagine circumstances without such 
a ruling. The state’s trade secret act would hold that information was 
not protected, and therefore employees would be free to use the 
information as they move to new employment. Despite this, 
companies would have a powerful weapon to wield against former 
employers in civil litigation or to hinder employee mobility. Even if 
an employee-defendant establishes that information is not a trade 
secret (perhaps because it is publicly available), the employer may 
still proceed using nebulous tort claims such as “breach of 
 
126 UTSA preemption is a topic addressed by a number of articles, including 
Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption and the Public 
Domain:  How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law Claims 
Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59 (2013).  Some of the 
states whose highest courts or appellate courts in precedential opinions have 
affirmed UTSA preemption include Robbins v. Supermarket Sales, LLC v. 
Supermarket Equip. Sales, LLC, 722 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Ga. 2012) (approving prior 
Georgia case law to hold that allowing injunctive relief for information that failed 
to qualify as a trade secret “undermined the exclusivity of the GTSA”); BlueEarth 
Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 235 P.3d 310 (Haw. 2010) (describing 
the current state of UTSA preemption law nationwide, and siding with other state 
supreme courts in favoring the majority approach); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. 
Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 665 (N.H. 2006) (affirming pre-trial order dismissing 
alternative claims, ruling that UTSA is intended as sole claim for trade secret 
misuse); RK Enter., LLC v. Pro-Comp Mgmt, Inc., 158 S.W.3d 685, 689–90 (Ark. 
2004) (reversing trial court; finding broad preemption of alternative tort claim); 
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 898 (Del. 2002) (affirming preemption 
of unfair competition and conspiracy claims at the pleading stage); Dicks v. 
Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Vt. 2001) (holding that UTSA preemption applies 
to common law claims even if the information does not meet the statutory 
definition of a trade secret); Frantz v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 351, 357–58 (Nev. 2000) 
(reversing trial court and holding in favor of broad preemption of various 
alternative tort claims); Weins v. Sporleder, 605 N.W.2d 488, 492 (S.D. 2000) 
(reversing trial court and holding in favor of broad preemption; explaining that it 
would render the UTSA “meaningless” if a plaintiff’s trade secret claim is 
dismissed and “plaintiffs can simply pursue the same claim in the name of a tort”).  
However, there is a minority position essentially deleting the UTSA’s preemption 
clause, characterized by rulings which egregiously misconstrue the statutory text 
and seemingly lack any awareness of the existence and purpose of statutory IP 
preemption.  E.g., American Biomed, Grp., Inc. v. Techtrol, Inc., 374 P.3d 820, 
827–28 (Okla. 2016) (misreading statutory text and ignoring official UTSA 
commentary for simplistic ruling that statute does not preempt purported torts 
over information said to be confidential but not secret—whatever that is supposed 
to encompass); Burbank Grease Serv., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 
2006) (ruling, over passionate dissent, against preemption of alternative tort 
claims despite preemption clause in Wisconsin UTSA; no analysis or awareness 
of public policy issues at stake with respect to IP preemption). 
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confidence” or “unfair competition.”127 Thus, in attempting to push 
back expansive trade secret claims that are being used in a troubling 
manner, one could inadvertently open up even more expansive 
pathways for troubling behavior.  
 
This prospect highlights the dangers that can occur as trade secret 
law expands rapidly into new areas. Now that the idea has taken hold 
in the mind of litigants that trade secret provides a potential weapon 
throughout the legal landscape, the race is on. In this crush, courts, 
legislators, and regulators can easily stumble as parties rush to apply 
trade secret in ever-expanding ways—leaving the history and logic 
of trade secret law to be trampled in the dust. In a similar vein, 
scholars and commentators, appalled at the aggressive tactics 
employed by those who assert trade secret claims at every turn, may 
also be tempted by approaches that solve the problem at hand while 
providing unintended consequences in collateral arenas. At this 
critical juncture in the history of trade secret law, it is essential to 
search out broad, comprehensive approaches that can impose 
discipline on the legal sprawl in a manner that is consistent and 
logically coherent across all boundaries. With this in mind, the 
following section suggests an approach that can resolve the question 
at hand in a manner that could be applied throughout doctrinal areas 
facing the invasive species of trade secret claims. Along the way, 
we will draw both from doctrines in other areas of intellectual 
property law and from doctrines in other areas of civil litigation that 
can help tame the sprawl. 
 
IV.   NAKED PRICE AND STEPPING BACK FROM THE BRINK 
 
As trade secret law continues to gain prominence, and as scholars, 
judges, and practitioners struggle with the public policy problems 
posed by overbroad application of trade secrecy assertions, we 
should strive to approach these problems in a manner that best serves 
the overall public interest, in addition to the public interest at stake 
in any given problem area.  Indeed, if recent articles are indicative, 
the attention given to the public interest in various aspects of trade 
secret law—many extending well outside the traditional area of 
employee/employee disputes—will only continue to grow.128  Here, 
we should theorize pricing in regulatory disputes in the 
pharmaceutical industry in a manner that is consonant with 
 
127 E.g., SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity Corp., 2012 WL 6160472 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(rejecting former employer’s attempt to proceed on tort claims styled as covering 
information said to be confidential, but not secret).  
128 See supra notes 9–13. 
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promoting the public interest in employment disputes as well as 
these other areas of law. 
 
To that end, we recognize that the Federal Act is in place now 
alongside the state Uniform Acts, and that case law under the 1939 
Restatement is merely a residual influence where it is consistent 
with these statutes.  We need to put the insights of other scholars 
regarding trade secrecy and pricing information, as well as new 
insights, to work in this contemporary legal environment.   
 
We start with the point that there is something perplexing about an 
assertion that a price is a company’s intellectual property, especially 
in the sense that society receives something in return for private 
protection. The case law cited above nibbles around the edges at best, 
and no court seems to have tackled this question at a deep analytical 
level. 
 
Defining the problem as one simply of ephemeral or transitory 
information is too imprecise.  After all, one can readily envision a 
sort of Eureka moment, where a scientist or engineer suddenly 
thinks of an idea that is new and novel, and that in and of itself is 
highly valuable.  Indeed, ideas—as ephemeral as they may be—can 
constitute trade secrets.129  By the same token, however, a company 
could spend years and millions of dollars to develop concrete and 
lasting technology that, unbeknownst to the developer, someone else 
released into the public domain, thus negating any trade secret 
protection. So comparing the time spent thinking about something, 
or the amount of time or effort put into creating something, versus 
an idea that arose quickly as a passing thought or a transitory 
moment, does not in and of itself tell us why pricing information 
should not receive trade secret status. 
 
One can find theoretical companionship in both copyright and patent 
law for the notion that determining whether something is properly 
the subject of protection does not rest on concepts such as the level 
 
129 E.g., Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab. Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26 
(2014) (finding that ideas can constitute trade secrets; plaintiff had idea for bar 
code scanner that was not developed into a product); Charles Tait Graves, Ruling 
Continues Solidification of Trade Secrets Law, DAILY JOURNAL, May 30, 2014 
(noting that it was “not surprising” that the Altavion court found business ideas to 
fall within the scope of trade secret law, and that a contrary result would have 
“badly damaged the overall structure of trade secret law” by encouraging litigants 
to turn to “vague, standards-free tort labels” to litigate over such information if it 
had been pushed outside the scope of the UTSA).  That said, Annemarie Bridy 
noted in comments to the authors that an idea might be seen as persistent, rather 
than ephemeral, because (at least in some cases) the value of the idea carries 
forward past a single transaction – unlike a price. 
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of effort and the concrete nature of the creation. Copyright doctrine, 
for example, holds that one does not gain rights in a work merely 
through the “sweat of the brow.” 130  A work must possess the 
requisite modicum of creativity, regardless of how much labor the 
inventor expended.131 As the Court noted: 
 
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of a 
compiler’s labor may be used by others without 
compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly 
observed, however, that is not “some unforeseen 
byproduct of a statutory regime. It is, rather “the 
essence of copyright . . . .”132  
 
Copyright in the United States does dictate that a work must be fixed 
in a tangible medium of expression to obtain protection, an approach 
that arguably prevents entirely ephemeral works from protection. 
Nevertheless, the copyright fixation requirement—with its logic 
related to proof of infringement133—is entirely separate from the 
question of whether the requisite creativity exists. All the fixation in 
the world will not render a noncreative work subject to protection.134   
 
Similarly, patent law has rejected analogous concepts. In rulings on 
patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court has rebuffed 
arguments that expensive research leading to valuable discoveries 
should be protectable.135 When the resulting invention is merely a 
law of nature, the result remains unpatentable.136 Patent law, in fact, 
does not even require the type of concreteness of fixation one might 
imagine. Rather a patent applicant need not have actually made the 
invention to obtain protection but can merely describe how one 
might go about it. This convention, known as “constructive 
 
130 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (landmark case 
rejecting judicially created “sweat of the brow” concept for copyright protection 
in a case concerning telephone books).  
131 See generally id. 
132 Id. at 349 (internal citations omitted). 
133 See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Fixation 
serves two basic roles: (1) easing problems of proof of creation and 
infringement. . . .” (quoting 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:22 
(2010)). 
134  See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 346–47 (identifying a minimal creativity 
requirement for copyright protection). 
135 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 91–92 
(2012) (rejecting patentable subject matter in a case related to medical 
diagnostics). 
136 See, e.g., id. 
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reduction to practice,”137 would not even meet copyright’s fixation 
requirement, given that the constructive reduction to practice is only 
a description, rather than the thing itself. The point is simply that 
copyright and patent law eschew notions such as level of effort and 
ephemerality for determining whether a creation should be the 
subject of protection. One can find theoretical companionship in 
both copyright and patent law for the notion that determining 
whether something is properly the subject of protection does not rest 
on concepts such as the level of effort and the concrete nature of the 
creation.  
 
In an analogous manner, ephemerality (or transitoriness) seems too 
elastic a concept by itself to address the question of whether material 
should constitute proper subject matter of trade secret protection.138  
Consider specifically the issue of price. A price may or may not be 
labeled transitory, as the contract reflecting the price may remain in 
force for some time.  
 
Instead, we should take the points made by the old Comment b in 
the Restatement, as well as statements in the courts which have 
expressed doubts about price information constituting a trade secret, 
as hints that a price is not intellectual property at all—at least in the 
highly regulated industry in question.  The reasons why are 
straightforward under a contemporary intellectual property theory.  
A price is not an idea.  It is a negotiated point representing value to 
be exchanged for something.  It is a point on a line between two 
adverse parties, not an act of creation.  A price is not an idea in the 
sense of an origin point for future development, or something latent 
for additional thinking:  it is not inchoate.  Even if one could argue 
that the terms and the pricing approaches one uses to arrive at the 
price are somehow tantamount to creation, the simple naked price is 
a number, not something particularly creative. Moreover, the value 
itself is an abstract placeholder:  it could have been something 
different and was arrived at through adverse negotiation where it 
was unknown until there was mutual agreement.  It is not the same 
thing as the development of the ideas instantiated in the 
pharmaceutical products being sold.  The property right in the 
contract is the amount due, the receivable—not the abstract signifier 
representing that amount.  
 
 
137  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2138.05 (9th ed. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
138 A definition of “ephemeral” is “lasting a very short time,” and synonyms 
include “transitory,” “transient,” “fleeting,” and “evanescent.” Ephemeral, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ephemeral 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020). 
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In fact, the entire notion of price as a creation crumbles apart when 
one presses on the notion of who the creators are. Price emerges 
during negotiations between the two parties to an agreement. Thus, 
price is born through the joint activity of two parties, not one alone. 
We are not talking about parthenogenesis here.139 If price were a 
valid joint creation of those parties, neither party would be able to 
reveal the secret, without the permission of the other. Thus, the drug 
company would not be able to use the same price (or even the same 
terms) with another PBM or another health plan without the original 
PBM’s permission, because the price would belong to the two of 
them jointly.140  
 
In addition, recall that the three PBMs control most of the PBM 
market. Suppose a drug company has prices or terms that are the 
similar for all three PBMs. Can price be a secret in that context when 
all of the PBMs competitors in an industry have a similar price and 
therefore know the secret? After all, the PBMs are theoretically joint 
owners if there is a secret; but if all of them are getting roughly the 
same price, all of them know the price, and there is no secret in their 
industry.141  In a broader context, beyond that of pharmaceutical 
companies, if price were a trade secret created jointly and thus co-
owned by the seller and the customer, sellers would be unable to 
charge substantially similar prices to customers. Doing so would 
risk that the customers would all know the secret, and thus, allowing 
the first customer to use litigation to inhibit the seller and its rivals.  
One cannot imagine that such an outcome—in which a company 
could not charge a similar price to more than one of its customers—
would be consistent with the underpinnings of trade secret law, 
which is firmly rooted in the notion that companies should be able 
to interact with others and conduct their business in a rational and 
efficient manner without risking their valuable intellectual property. 
 
 
139 In parthenogenesis, reproduction occurs when a female gamete produces an 
embryo without any genetic contribution from a male gamete. See Ursula 
Mittwoch, Parthenogensis, 15 J. MED. GENET. 165 (1978). 
140 See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 5.01[1][c] n.10 (2017 ed.) (“Courts have held 
that one joint owner’s use of a secret without the permission of the other states a 
trade secret claim, and that one joint owner’s disclosure to a knowing third party 
without the other’s permission also states a claim against both the discloser and 
the recipient.”; citing cases including MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc. 2006 
WL 3530726, at *5 (D. Kan. 2006) (joint owner sued the other owner and its 
parent)). 
141  The existence of information aggregation services in the pharmaceutical 
industry could, in itself, threaten the existence of the secret. To the extent that 
these services are able to reverse engineer the price and offer to sell that 
information, the information would become knowable and no longer secret. 
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Moreover, price is created in an adversarial process. 142  An 
adversarial process appears decidedly different from the normal 
context of joint creation. And if the creation belongs jointly to the 
PBM and the drug company, is the PBM violating its fiduciary duty 
to the health plan as the agent and brokers for those plans by creating 
intellectual property that will be owned jointly with a party who is 
supposed to be on the other side of the table from the health plan? 
Together, all of these issues illustrate the logical absurdity of the 
notion that price is some type of a creation that should be subject to 
intellectual property protection of any kind.  
 
This is especially so in the narrow context at issue, with its specific 
types of agreements.  In the case of PBM contracts, the existence of 
the agreement, the identities of the contracting parties and the goods 
and services to be exchanged for that value are all known.  These 
are not secret transactions.  PBM contracts are not the product of 
secret customer lists, where one party to the transaction is unknown.  
Much is known. This is not a startup company working in so-called 
“stealth mode” on an idea that is being kept deeply hidden. Indeed, 
the economic marker of price is among the few major points that are 
not already transparent in these contracts.  Where so many variables 
are already known, the case for trade secrecy over price is weaker 
than, say, a business transaction that is entirely unknown, and 
outside a highly regulated environment. 
 
Ultimately, a price is not a company’s intellectual property in this 
scenario, but instead is a negotiated deal point that an incumbent 
hopes to hold onto in order to avoid competition. The incumbent got 
there first, so to speak, and the price is the point at which it arrived. 
Nevertheless, the company wants to treat “getting there first” as 
equivalent to “intellectual property.”  In short, in the PBM context 
where the contracting parties are known, the subject of their 
agreement is known, and the product being sold is known, the price 
at which the parties arrive is not propertizable intellectual 
property. 143  The Restatement’s concepts of ephemerality and 
transitoriness point in the right direction, but do not provide nearly 
the necessary logical and theoretical robustness.  
 
 
142 For discussions of perverse incentives in which the PBM middle players may 
be tempted to act in the interests of the drug companies rather than in the interests 
of the PBMs’ own client, the health plan, see generally FELDMAN, supra note 5. 
143  There is a further consideration for older pricing information as to past 
contracts.  Even if one treated current pricing information as a trade secret, 
outdated information may lack the economic value required under the DTSA and 
the UTSA.  See generally Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 154 Cal. App. 
4th 547, 578 (2007) (trade secret claim over obsolete software items failed 
because such software did not meet the UTSA’s value requirement). 
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Even if one were to conclude that bare negotiated price points 
between PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers might constitute 
trade secret, however, there would be no show-stopping immunity 
against regulatory disclosure in the context of trade secret. To begin 
with, the Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts do not provide an 
immunity to the owner of a trade secret against regulatory disclosure.  
The state uniform acts provide trade secret owners with a range of 
remedies against civil misappropriation, while the federal act also 
provides for prosecutions against criminal misappropriation.  Both 
statutes seek to balance interests between civil plaintiffs (or 
prosecutors) and defendants by offering limited rights balanced by 
the need for a robust public domain and rights to independent 
development.  Importantly, neither purports to preempt regulatory 
or administrative statutes.   
 
For example, California’s version of the Uniform Act states that it 
“does not supersede . . . any statute otherwise regulating trade 
secrets.”144  More directly, the federal act provides two different 
types of immunities, but none against regulatory disclosure.  It 
immunizes whistleblowers who disclose their employer’s trade 
secrets to counsel or to the government from lawsuits by their 
employers,145 and it immunizes internet service providers from civil 
misappropriation claims based on user-generated content pursuant 
to 47 U.S.C. § 230.146  But the federal act contains no immunity 
against legislation or regulations requiring pharmaceutical pricing 
disclosures, even though Congress was surely well aware that 
various regulatory regimes require submission of potentially 
confidential information by private companies with at least some 
 
144 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(a).  This language, one of the exceptions to the 
UTSA’s general preemption of overlapping tort claims, was undoubtedly 
designed as a savings clause to avoid conflict with the many California statutes 
that in some fashion regulate trade secrets— including regulatory disclosure 
measures.  See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060 (treatment of trade secrets in civil 
proceedings); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 14022 (treatment of trade secrets 
submitted to government during pesticide evaluations); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
6254.7 (same for air pollution data).   
145  See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (“Immunity from Liability for Confidential 
Disclosure of a Trade Secret to the Government or in a Court Filing”). 
146 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376 
(2016), § 2(g) (stating, perhaps oddly at first glance, that the DTSA is not a statute 
pertaining to intellectual property—language necessary to fit the statute into 
Section 230’s safe harbor immunity); Craft Beer Stellar, LLC v. Glassdoor, Inc., 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178960, 2018 WL 5084837 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2018) 
(applying immunity to dismiss DTSA claim against website which allows users 
to anonymously review their employers); Eric Goldman, The Defend Trade 
Secrets Act isn’t an “Intellectual Property” Law, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 541 (2016) (commentary on immunity). 
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possibility of public disclosure.147  Though by no means dispositive, 
the point is that PBMs received no specific protection in this recent 
legislation.  
 
In short, trade secret law does not present some unusual barrier to 
regulatory activity.  Rather, any regulatory activity should lead 
instead to the weighing and balancing of the public interest versus 
the supposed harm in disclosing such pricing. Legislatures are 
capable of making reasoned decisions regarding this calculus—
especially as to business entities who seek to characterize the very 
product of their market-capture (artificially high pricing) as 
intellectual property.148  Indeed, the case where companies engaging 
in exploitation of the citizenry who are effectively captive buyers 
under health insurance policies to high pharmaceutical prices 
appears to be a model instance where regulators should put the 
brakes on overbroad use of trade secrecy assertions. This would 
echo legislation enacted in the interest of consumers who face 
serious disadvantages such as information asymmetry, 149  high-
pressure sales tactics,150 and extremely limited bargaining power.151 
 
147  Cf. Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less 
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 579–580 (1979) 
(seminal article on regulatory failure by Justice Breyer prior to joining the Court 
noting that disclosure regulation can serve as an effective alternative to classical 
regulation in achieving a more competitive market when “the public can 
understand the information disclosed and is free to choose on the basis of that 
information.”).  
148  See supra note 95 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of North 
Dakota reached such a decision, finding that price information constituted a trade 
secret, but that it nonetheless was subject to regulatory disclosure and did not 
constitute a taking, given the public interest in rates charged in natural gas 
agreements.  See N. States Power Co. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm., 502 N.W.2d 
240, 247 (N.D. 1993). 
149  See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006) (federal law related to 
automobile purchasing); see also 120 CONG. REC. S40,711 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 
1974) (statement of Sen. Frank Moss) (“By making warranties of consumer 
products clear and understandable through creating a uniform terminology of 
warranty coverage, consumers will for the first time have a clear and concise 
understanding of the terms of warranties of products they are considering 
purchasing.”). Mandatory banking disclosures serve a similar purpose in creating 
greater market transparency to reduce asymmetric information. See, e.g., 
Disclosure of Financial and Other Information by FDIC-Insured State 
Nonmember Banks, 84 Fed. Reg. 9698–9702 (Mar. 18, 2019) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 350). 
150  See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2015) (strengthening a 1972 Federal Trade 
Commission Cooling-Off Rule designed to prevent “deceptive and unfair 
practices, including high pressure sales tactics; misrepresenting the quality of 
goods; and placing inappropriate roadblocks to obtaining refunds”). 
151 See UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (holding that upon finding a contract 
unconscionable, a court may refuse to enforce the entire contract, enforce the 
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To the extent that courts and legislatures may struggle with these 
issues, the struggle would highlight the paucity of decisions and 
analyses at the intersection of trade secret with other regimes, as 
well as the need for more robust doctrines in trade secret, itself. 
 
V. THIN TRADE SECRET 
 
Perhaps no single statement sums up the state of legal scholarship 
in the realm of intellectual property than a comment from the legal 
scholar Richard Epstein, who dryly noted the following:  
 
The Field of intellectual property is a growth industry 
that may, for all I know, involve, an unintended 
consequence of Moore’s Law in that the number of 
published articles in the field doubles on average 
every eighteen months. Most of that increased effort 
has been devoted to copyright and patents.152 
 
Although trade secret literature also has expanded since Epstein’s 
comment in 2004, patent and copyright remain well ahead of trade 
secret, not only in terms of the number of articles published, but also 
in terms of deep theoretical treatment. Even fifteen years of 
miraculous brilliance in a field are unlikely to make up for centuries 
of consideration in the judiciary and the academy. 
 
With this in mind, trade secret could benefit from the wisdom of 
experience gained in generations of development of copyright and 
patent law.  After all, though only patent and copyright can trace 
their heritage to Constitutional provisions, all three doctrinal realms 
flow from a consistent logical grounding: individuals would be 
unwilling to invest in developing creations and bringing those 
creations forward for the benefit of society unless the legal system 
guaranteed the creators the potential to enjoy a return on the fruits 
 
remainder without the offending clause, or limit the contracts. application to avoid 
an unconscionable result); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (defining unconscionability as “an absence of 
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms 
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. . . . In many cases the 
meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining 
power”). 
152 Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secret Under the 
Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 57 (2004); see also Bridy, supra note 66, 
at 188 (citing Epstein’s comment for the proposition that “trade secrets have taken 
a back seat to copyrights and patents in the explosion of scholarship on intellectual 
property in recent years”). 
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of their labor, free from those who would copy.153  We note, of 
course, certain important caveats embedded in the language.  
Among those are that the system exists for the benefit of society, not 
the benefit of creators,154 that protecting a robust public domain is a 
strong public interest,155 and that the law guarantees no more than 
an opportunity to garner a return, rather than guaranteeing a 
particular return or any return at all.156 Nevertheless, the more robust 
jurisprudence of patent and copyright has dealt with a myriad of 
challenges as those doctrinal areas have developed into their more 
familiar modern forms—particularly when those intellectual 
property regimes have brushed up against other policy arenas.  
 
This is not to suggest that intellectual property always yields in the 
face of other societal goals, or that it necessarily should. Rather, 
patent and copyright each have developed doctrines to delineate 
boundaries with other policies embedded in the legal system in an 
effort to ensure that society can remain faithful to the underlying 
logic of both. Thus, for example, patent law developed the doctrine 
of patent misuse in the early twentieth century, as patent 
jurisprudence crashed headlong into the burgeoning area of antitrust 
law.157 In the same vein, copyright developed the doctrine of “thin” 
protection as courts struggled with the need to respect other societal 
goals, including freedom of information, and as society adapted to 
the tectonic shifts of the digital age. In general, doctrines such as 
misuse and thin protection embody the recognition that intellectual 
property rights are not solid monoliths, presenting an impenetrable 
wall through which no party but the rights holder may pass. Rather, 
intellectual property regimes are brilliantly nimble and subtle 
systems, deftly threading their way among various societal goals.  
 
 
153 See Epstein, supra note 152, at 57 (noting that “[i]n many ways, the logic for 
protecting trade secrets parallels that for protecting patents and copyrights. People 
will not develop certain forms of information at private cost if the benefits of that 
information can be immediately socialized by the unilateral actions of others”). 
154 See supra note 59.  
155 E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) 
(“Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and 
technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”). 
156 See FELDMAN, supra note 56, at 3, 50–75 (introducing the bargain theory of 
patents and explaining that “a patent grants some form of an opportunity—a seat 
at the bargaining table, with certain rules in place”); see also Gideon 
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66 
(2005) (noting that studies suggest the vast majority of patents earn no returns at 
all for their patent holders).  
157 See Robin Feldman, Patent & Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. 
J. OF L. & TECH. 1 (2008).  
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Along these lines, the doctrine of thin copyright protection is 
particularly illuminating. The term “thin” copyright emerged in the 
early 1990s in the Feist case, in which the Supreme Court 
considered the question of copyright protection in a phone book. 
The Court found that copyright protection in a factual work is “thin” 
given that facts reside in the public domain and others are free to use 
the factual information contained in a work. The Court emphasized 
that “copyright is not a tool by which a compilation author may keep 
others from using the facts or data he or she has collected.”158 
 
When copyright is “thin,” the work reflects only scant creativity, 
although some creativity in the creation or arrangement of 
information is present. 159  In that circumstance, certain other 
elements of the case must be particularly strong to warrant a finding 
of copyright infringement. Specifically, some courts require 
evidence of what is called “supersubstantial similarity” to find 
infringement. 160  Courts have found thin copyright protection in 
cases rejecting claims ranging from architectural plans to Barbie 
dolls. 161  The logic of thin copyright reflects the concern that 
copyright might be used to reach beyond its boundaries—extending 
its grasp to subject matter that should not be restricted to the public 
and blocking activity outside of the creative appropriation that 
copyright was intended to prevent.  
 
Beyond the doctrine of “thin” copyright, copyright law’s fair use 
doctrine similarly reflects the need to prevent copyright from 
reaching beyond its intended boundaries and to balance competing 
public interests. Dating back to the nineteenth century, fair use is a 
judicially created doctrine, eventually codified by Congress in the 
1976 Copyright Act.162  Under the doctrine, even if someone has 
copied a protected work, the court may rule that the copying is fair 
rather than foul. 163  The fair use doctrine allows copying “for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . 
 
158 See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991). 
159 See id. at 349. 
160 MELVILLE NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][4] (2019) 
161 See generally Charles W. Ross, Inc. v. Olsen Fine Home Bldg., LLC, 977 F. 
Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. Va. 2013); Dream Custom Homes, Inc. v. Modern Day 
Constr., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Jeff Benton Homes, Inc. v. 
Ala. Heritage Homes, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2013); and Mattel, 
Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010).  
162 U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Mar. 2019), 
https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use.  
163 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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scholarship, or research.”164 In the words of the Supreme Court, the 
doctrine “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright 
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which 
that law is designed to foster.” 165  More importantly, fair use 
recognizes the importance of various public interests that might be 
swept aside by an overzealous enforcement regime.166  
 
A fair use deliberation includes, but is not limited to, four factors, 
one of which is the nature of the copyrighted work.167 Under this 
factor, the more a work is functional or informational, the less 
protection the work will receive. 168  As the Supreme Court has 
explained, the second fair use factor, “calls for recognition that some 
works are closer to the core of copyright protection than others.”169 
In the same vein as the thinness doctrine, fair use attempts to ensure 
that copyright will not be used to cut off access to material that 
should be in the public domain or to reach beyond the circumstances 
in which copyright was intended to operate. Both doctrines thereby 
balance copyright with competing public interests.   
 
The misuse doctrines of patent and copyright are cut from the same 
cloth. Both patent misuse and copyright misuse are infringement 
defenses directed at attempts to improperly expand the time or scope 
of the rights granted.170 They are reminders that intellectual property 
rights are limited grants for limited purposes, not a government 
license to mow down anyone in one’s path. As one of the authors 
 
164 See id. The categories are not exclusive, with the legislation noting “purposes 
such as” and the four factors described as to be “included” but not as limited to. 
See, e.g., DSC Commc’n Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Tex. 
1995) (considering the manner in which the material was acquired as part of the 
inquiry in the case on the grounds that the four statutory factors are not exclusive).  
165 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting 
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
166 See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) 
(quoting Justice Stewart’s opinion in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)) (copyright, “reflects a balance of competing claims 
upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but 
private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public 
availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”). 
167 Together, the four factors are: 1) the purpose and character of the use; 2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
taken; and 4) the effect on the market. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
168 See NIMMER, supra note 160, at § 13.05; see also Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG 
Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing NIMMER); Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014) (same).  
169 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing NIMMER). 
170 See FELDMAN, supra note 56, at 137-142 (explaining patent misuse); Troy 
Paredes, Copyright Misuse Tying: Will Courts Stop Misusing Misuse, 9 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 271, 272 (1994) (explaining copyright misuse). 
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has noted, “the law would not look kindly upon a patent-holder who 
insists that anyone who wants to license the invention must agree to 
murder the inventor’s mother-in-law.”171  
 
As doctrines of equity, patent and copyright misuse spring from the 
notion of requiring that parties who come to the court must do so 
with unclean hands. As the age-old maxim goes, one who seeks 
equity must do equity. In this vein, recent scholarship has suggested 
that courts develop a doctrine of trade secret misuse to address 
overreaching by trade secret owners.172 Trade secret misuse could 
be deployed as a defense to improper licensing and enforcement 
practices that threaten to expand the breadth of a trade secret 
holder’s domain, and we welcome recent commentary in this 
direction.173 
 
Although important, intellectual property misuse doctrines have 
certain drawbacks that need to be addressed in the trade secret space 
in order to render a trade secret misuse theory most effective. The 
remedy for patent and copyright misuse traditionally has been that 
the intellectual property becomes unenforceable—not just in 
conjunction with the particular behavior or in the case at hand, but 
in any circumstance, at least until the misuse has been cleared.174 In 
light of these potentially draconian effects, courts are reluctant to 
find misuse, which renders the doctrine less effective than one might 
hope.175  
 
Moreover, the history of patent and copyright misuse is deeply 
entwined with antitrust. Both trace their roots to early nineteenth 
century caselaw regarding anti-competitive behavior. 176  The 
troubling issues arising in the expansive use of modern trade secret 
law, however, range far beyond anti-competitive conduct (although 
that concern may be implicated at times). Rather, trade secret is 
wandering into arenas that raise concerns regarding freedom of 
speech, ability to petition for redress, labor protections, retaliatory 
 
171 See Feldman, supra note 157, at 5. 
172 See Varadarajan, supra note 9, at 783, 798 (advocating the adoption of a 
doctrine of trade secret misuse, akin to copyright misuse, to address “problematic 
behavior” such as “restraining reverse engineering, deterring critical speech, and 
overclaiming trade secret scope to legally unsophisticated employees”). 
173 Id. at 744. 
174 See id. at 797 (discussing the problem); Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 HOUS. 
L. REV. 901, 903, 963–964 (2007) (arguing in favor of reforming the remedy so 
that the particular provision becomes unenforceable, rather than rendering the 
entire intellectual property right unenforceable for a period of time).  
175 See Varadarjan, supra note 9, at 797. 
176  See generally Paredes, supra note 170 (tracing the history of copyright 
misuse). 
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behavior, racial inequality, and other deep societal concerns. 177 
Thus, a remedy grounded in anti-competitive concerns could fall 
short unless it is tailored for a trade secret-specific application. The 
promising new scholarship on trade secret misuse is hopefully the 
start of a new wave of curbing trade secret overreach through such 
calibration. Its development highlights the need for developing 
doctrines to delineate appropriate limitations for trade secret’s 
wanderings.  
 
VI. A THEORY OF “THIN” TRADE SECRET PROTECTION 
 
Companies seeking to avoid regulatory disclosure of pharmaceutical 
pricing information seem to implicitly propose a hard binary:  If any 
item of information makes it over the line to qualify as a trade secret, 
even if just barely, it is thus immune from disclosure. In short, the 
potential industry argument is that trade secrecy poses an 
insurmountable hurdle to requiring disclosure of pharmaceutical 
pricing, so long as trade secrecy is established even minimally. The 
trade secret statutes, however, do not support this conclusion.  
Rather, trade secrecy mirrors its sister intellectual property doctrines 
in their nuanced and delicate balancing of public interests.   
 
The Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts do not reflect a one-
sided regime.  Despite its title (“defend trade secrets”), the Federal 
Act reflects the same balance of interests seen in enactments of the 
state Uniform Acts.  Both are utilitarian statutes that, as their texts 
demonstrate, seek to balance the rights and obligations of those who 
create and share non-public, unpatented178  business information.  
Both promote economic activity by providing limited rights in 
information that meets threshold requirements in order to 
incentivize investments in the infrastructure needed for innovation, 
but both also protect parties accused of misappropriation by 
providing a wide variety of defenses—and, in some cases, sanctions 
 
177 See, e.g., Varadarajan, supra note 9, at 783; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 50–53. 
178 Some information protected by trade secret could potentially be patentable, if 
it were to meet the patentability elements of novelty, nonobviousness, utility, 
proper subject matter, and sufficient disclosure—as well as going through the 
process of receiving a patent through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. See 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2006). Once the patent application is published, however, 
the information becomes public, and potential trade secrecy is lost. For most 
patent applicants, publication occurs eighteen months after the patent application 
is filed, regardless of whether the patent has been granted. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 
(2006); see also Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 21, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 
1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (explaining that most patent applicants apply for patents 
outside of the United States, and that treaty obligations require publication of 
patent applications after eighteen months in those circumstances). 
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against the trade secret claimant.179  Above all, by limiting the scope 
of trade secret rights, the Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts 
ultimately serve the public interest by securing a broad freedom to 
use and enjoy unprotected information.  In both the judicial and 
legislative realms, trade secret embeds a substantial dedication to 
the public interest, by maintaining a robust public domain. Trade 
secrets are not natural rights.  They do not exist outside the legal 
framework, and there is no metaphysical quality to their 
conception.180 As such, trade secret should not be used a tool to 
hammer an unwitting public.  
 
The goal of intellectual property is to bring innovations to society 
for their use. This is framed by the general economic argument that 
free markets are able to maximize social utility for the nation’s 
citizens. 181  We interfere with the free market—by granting 
intellectual property rights to inventors—solely to provide the 
incentive for inventors to create their innovations and share those 
innovations with society. Yes, competitors might beat out the prices, 
if they knew them. That is the point of a free market.182 Society 
deviates from that system only to the extent incentives are necessary, 
and the intellectual property systems are designed to limit 
protections to those things legislatures have determined are needed 
to provide the requisite incentives. The robust freedom to use lots of 
information reflects the fact that use of the information is the goal 
in the first place. 
 
Thus, for the point discussed here, the relevant public interest is the 
free-market economy and the free use of innovations. Those general 
values are buttressed further by the nation’s historic interest in 
 
179  E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (independent derivation and reverse 
engineering are not “improper means”); 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (6)(B) (same); CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2) (reasonable security measures requirement); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839(3)(A) (same). 
180 Commentators have debated the nature of trade secret rights.  Some but not all 
view trade secret theory as we do, as a property-oriented body of law.  Others find 
bases for trade secret law in contract, or in utilitarian theory.  E.g., Robert G. Bone, 
The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2014); 
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law:  Doctrine in Search of 
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising 
Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311 (2009); 
Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 1 (2007); Charles T. Graves, Trade Secrets as Property:  Theory and 
Consequences, 15 GA. J. OF INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007); Miguel Deutch, The 
Property Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-American Law:  An Ongoing Debate, 
31 U. RICH. L. REV. 313, 321 (1997). 
181 See 2 ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH 
OF NATIONS 181 (1799). 
182 See generally supra Part II. 
 121 
freedom of speech, which is reflected in the First Amendment.183 
This is not to suggest that all information unprotected by trade secret 
is strictly necessary for First Amendment protections. Rather the 
free flow of information is a value deeply embedded in the nation’s 
history and reflected in the balances struck in the US intellectual 
property system between protected information and information that 
is free to all and reserved to none. Once again, this stands in contrast 
to any notion of innovation as the moral or natural right of 
inventors—a concept generally foreign to the history and theory of 
intellectual property in the United States.184 
 
As trade secret emerges fully into the pantheon of intellectual 
property protections, this area of law must develop its own concepts 
for articulating the limits of its reach. No intellectual property right 
can be boundless. Consistent with their utilitarian underpinnings, all 
intellectual property rights must establish their limits and endpoints 
in a manner that properly reflect the public policy balances reflected 
therein.  
 
With trade secret becoming a weapon of choice in contemporary 
intellectual property litigation, there is a growing risk that it will be 
used in manners far beyond its animating logic of balancing interests 
between parties, generally those who were in privity with one 
another, regarding ordinary-course business information. Thus, 
courts should consider borrowing from copyright to develop its own 
version of thinness. 185  Thin trade secret would exist when the 
independent economic value or creation aspect of the secret is scant, 
 
183 For literature on the relationship between free speech and intellectual property, 
see, e.g., Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of 
Intellectual Property and Free Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2013); Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After 
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697 (2003); Joseph P. 
Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy 
Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 831 (2010); Edmund T. Wang, The Line 
Between Copyright and the First Amendment and Why Its Vagueness May Further 
Free Speech Interests, 13 J. OF CONST. L. 1471 (2011); Tun-Jen Chiang, Patents 
and Free Speech, 107 GEO. L.J. 309 (2019); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First 
Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008). 
184 See FELDMAN, supra note 56, at 76–78. 
185 For a very useful analogy in a litigation context, see Joseph P. Fishman & 
Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (2019) 
(recommending a materiality filter for civil litigation cases involving allegations 
of wrongful commercial use, based in part on an analogy to copyright’s thinness 
doctrine, to screen out trade secret claims unless the trade secret and the 
defendant’s product bear an especially high degree of similarity to each other).  
Varadarajan has also written about the need to develop a fair use-type theory for 
trade secret law.  See Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Fair Use, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1401 (2014). 
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such that the item of information qualifies for protection, but only 
just so.186 Unlike secret formula and manufacturing techniques, thin 
information would exist near the margins of trade secret protection. 
At this distance from the core conceptualization of what is 
protectable, they would rest on a lighter limb of the trade secret tree. 
In that case, the tug of a countervailing public policy interest would 
have particular force. One would not want defendants to simply 
claim any interest in the guise of public policy, however. Thus, thin 
copyright could be designed primarily for circumstances in which 
trade secret comes into conflict with other doctrinal areas 
embodying their own public policies. In those circumstances, the 
doctrine of thin trade secret creates space for navigating the 
boundaries.  
 
The doctrine of thin trade secret is distinct from the notion of 
confidential-but-not-secret information that a relational, non-
property conception of trade secret law would entertain.  Thin trade 
secret operates only when the information is within the bounds of 
statutory trade secret status, albeit at the edge of those bounds. In 
this manner, thin trade secret avoids the trap of creating a vague 
second tier of protectable information that falls outside the bounds 
of statutory trade secret protection, a development which would only 
incentivize the aggressive litigation of weak and nebulous claims, 
without the framework of rules and defenses the trade secret statutes 
provide to adjudicate and rebut such claims. There is a risk, of 
course, that with the existence of thin trade secret, judges could 
inadvertently sweep unwarranted information into the trade secret 
fold. Information might be easier to declare a trade secret, given the 
comfort of being able to deny protection in a particular case through 
the public interest. Without great care, such an approach could allow 
the boundaries of trade secret to creep ever wider across time. All 
jurisprudential arenas, however, face the temptation of rules of 
convenience, and the antidote is the same throughout.  Regardless 
of the doctrinal area, courts and commentators must find analyses 
that can be applied with logical consistency across the regime, rather 
than resting on handy decisions in a particular case that create 
distinctions without a difference.187  
 
 
186 As Sharon Sandeen noted in comments to the authors, one potential hook for 
a theory of “thin” trade secret protection exists in the statutory text, in the 
requirement that a trade secret have independent economic value.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1839 (3)(b); CAL. CIV. CODE 3426.1(d)(1) (UTSA example).  Such value is a 
sliding scale—some trade secrets are more valuable than others—and thus scant 
value may be one way to approach the further development of this concept. 
187 See generally Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 
GREEN BAG 27 (2014) (criticizing the Federal Circuit for relying on rules of 
convenience and describing such an approach as “death by tinkering”). 
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The concept of thin trade secret has the potential to protect trade 
secret regime from a societal backlash as new claims stray into 
uncharted territory. Without such an outlet, courts, in frustration 
over expansive claiming, could be tempted to slash large and 
ambiguous swaths of territory, generating confusion in trade secret 
doctrine. By delineating an area of greater force for public policy, 
thin trade secret would cabin analysis into a common zone for 
discussion and thus lessen the chance of mayhem throughout the 
regime.  To be sure, developing a theory of thin trade secret cannot 
be accomplished in one step.  Practical questions, such as what 
justifications permit application of the concept and what degree of 
use or disclosure in particular concepts are weighed against 
protection, await future commentary. 
 
One could conceivably consider borrowing from copyright to 
develop a fair use trade secret defense. In that vein, courts could 
examine whether other policies might outweigh a finding that a 
party’s trade secret has been used. Thinness, however, has the 
advantage of signaling that the supposed trade secret just barely 
makes it over the line, a conclusion that seems particularly 
appropriate for these circumstances. 
 
Although intellectual property misuse may provide a useful pathway, 
we believe that more narrow and targeted rules will be important. In 
particular, at the dawn of doctrinal development, one would be well-
advised to proceed with caution. Thus, the concept of thin trade 
secret provides a careful approach for recognition of expanding 
areas of innovation without trampling the public policies reflected 
in doctrinal areas with which trade secret must interact. 
 
Once again, the example of drug prices and regulatory disclosure is 
illustrative. As described above, naked price does not fall within the 
bounds of trade secrets. Even if a court were to find that bare 
negotiated price points between PBMs and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers fell within the bounds of trade secrets, those rights 
would be achingly close to the line. At most, if pricing information 
in the special context of PBM agreements were deemed to be a trade 
secret at all, it would be a thin and untraditional right, not core 
intellectual property.  It should pale in comparison to thick IP rights 
such as manufacturing process details, formula details, and other 
scientific work products.  A thin, barely-over-the-line trade secret 
hardly deserves the same deference in a regulatory disclosure 
context as the latter types of information. 
 
It should be particularly susceptible to the public policy concerns 
underlying the need for disclosure in a regulatory context. Such a 
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status should not be a hard binary, or immunity, against regulatory 
disclosure when the public interest so warrants.188 
 
VII.  EMPLOYING THE TOOLS OF TRADE SECRET DOCTRINE 
 
Although new concepts are needed to bring coherence and to reign 
in the overreach of trade secret, one should not ignore the practical 
tools in existence which can assist in implementing these concepts. 
It is important to recognize that trade secret law already contains 
approaches that can be useful for courts, regulatory agencies, and 
legislatures to use in preventing trade secret from running rampant. 
In particular, procedural mechanisms borrowed from civil trade 
secret litigation can help attorneys for government entities push 
back against cookie-cutter, overbroad claims to trade secrecy, 
thereby separating unprotectable pricing information from other 
information subject to trade secret protection.  These mechanisms 
also offer a means to introduce the concept of “thin” trade secret 
protection into already-recognized frameworks for defining and 
narrowing a party’s claimed trade secrets. 
 
A.  Rejecting Overly Conclusory Industry Submissions 
 
To begin with, courts should be prepared to reject vague, check-the-
box declarations submitted by pharmaceutical companies declaring 
high-level categories of information to be trade secrets, in 
conclusory language.  As discussed above, recent litigation has seen 
a flurry of such overbroad secrecy assertions.  In the 2017 Nevada 
case, for example, declarants and their attorneys used such phrases 
as “confidential, completely sensitive, proprietary information 
regarding the production, cost, pricing, marketing, and advertising 
of their patented diabetes medicines” and “cost structure, resource 
allocation, and pricing practices.”189 
 
This type of argument does not come close to articulating specific, 
precise information asserted to constitute trade secrets, and thus 
renders it difficult for courts (and government attorneys) to focus 
arguments on precise information such as price, rebates, and profits 
 
188 In part because takings analysis assumes that there is a valid property right, 
we have not addressed the literature on takings in this Article.  For a discussion 
of takings law in the context of patents, see FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 106–108; 
see also  Robin Feldman, Betty Chang Rowe, Rabiah Oral, Amy Y. Gu & 
Katherine Gudhiksen, The Patent Act and the Constitutionality of State 
Pharmaceutical Regulation, 45 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 40 (2019). 
189  See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction at 1,8, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-
02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 2017). 
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margins for a specific agreement.  Just as some courts have rejected 
overly conclusory submissions by those seeking to prevent 
regulatory disclosure of pricing information in other contexts,190 the 
same should hold true in litigation over PBM pricing agreements. 
 
B. Requiring Particularized Identification of Asserted Trade 
Secrets 
 
Courts can apply analogous techniques with asserted claims, as well 
as with party declarations. Specifically, a powerful means to push 
back against contentions that pharmaceutical pricing constitutes a 
trade secret is to insist that those claiming trade secret protection 
identify, with at least reasonable particularity, each separate item of 
information asserted as a trade secret.  This tool, which can be 
borrowed from decades of civil litigation, can be an effective means 
to prevent vague, overbroad secrecy contentions deployed to hide 
narrower items that hardly deserve protection. 
 
In civil trade secret litigation, the plaintiff tactically expresses its 
alleged trade secrets in a generalized and conclusory fashion, in 
order to prevent the defendant from preparing defenses such as non-
secrecy, and to afford maximum latitude to shape-shift the claims to 
conform to the defendant’s own technology once the technology is 
produced during discovery.  In response, two state legislatures have 
required that plaintiffs identify the alleged trade secrets with some 
particularity before discovery begins. 191   Many other courts, 
including federal courts, have imposed that pre-discovery 
requirement through case law. 192   Still others have enforced a 
 
190 E.g., GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(ruling in favor of release of “percentage and dollar amount[s]” paid to 
government subcontractors, and rejecting unpersuasive declarations submitted by 
contractors to supposed competitive harm). 
191 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019.210 (enacted in 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 93 § 42D(b) (enacted in 2018). 
192 E.g., Ohio: A&P Tech., Inc. v. Lariviere, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211822, at 
*24 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 2017); Texas:  United Serv. Auto Ass’n v. Mitek Sys., 
Inc., 289 F.R.D. 244, 248 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013), aff’d, 2013 WL 1867417 
(W.D. Tex. April 24, 2013); Connecticut: Powerweb Energy, Inc. v. Hubbell 
Lighting, Inc., 2012 WL 3113162, at *1–2 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012); Nevada:  
Switch Commc’n Grp. v. Ballard, 2012 WL 2342929, at *4–5 (D. Nev. June 19, 
2012); Florida: AAR Mfg., Inc. v. Matrix Composites, Inc., 98 So.3d 186, 187 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Del Monte Fresh Produce Co. v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 
148 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2001); New York:  MSCI Inc. v. Jacob, 
945 N.Y.S.2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 2012); New Jersey: Avaya Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 
2011 WL 4962817, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2011); Colorado: L-3 Commc’ns Corp. 
v. Jaxon Eng’g & Maint., Inc., No. 10-cv-02868-MSK-KMT (D. Colo. Oct. 12, 
2011); North Carolina: Ikon Office Sol., Inc. v. Konica Minolta Bus. Sol. USA, 
Inc., 2009 WL 4429156, at *4 (W.D.N.C. 2009); Michigan: Giasson Aerospace 
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similar requirement during discovery disputes, by requiring that a 
plaintiff provide specific answers to a defendant’s interrogatory 
seeking a clear description of each alleged trade secret.193  What 
often results is a numbered list of written claims, though sometimes 
several rounds of motion practice are required to obtain clear 
information. 
 
In the regulatory context, courts can leverage this case law by 
analogy to require pharmaceutical companies asserting trade 
secrecy rights to identify purported trade secrets with precision.  
This will better allow regulatory disclosure to focus on the narrow, 
exact pricing information to be disclosed, while barring companies 
from using conclusory language and bundles of information to 
prevent a focus on whether such precise information constitutes a 
trade secret. 
 
C. Parsing Combination/Compilation Trade Secret Claims 
 
Third, courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies should not allow 
pharmaceutical companies to rely on allegations of so-called 
 
Sci., Inc. v. RCO Eng’g, 2009 WL 1384179, at *2 (E.D. Mich. 2009); Utah: 
Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Symantec Corp., 2009 WL 361282, at *2 (D. Utah 
Feb. 11, 2009); Georgia:  DeRubeis v. Witten Tech., Inc., 244 F.R.D. 676, 682 
(N.D. Ga. 2007); Illinois: Automed Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 925–
26 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Minnesota: Porus Media Corp. v. Midland Brake, Inc., 187 
F.R.D. 598, 600 (D. Minn. 1999); Delaware: Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion 
Tech., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D. Del. 1991); see also New Hampshire:  GT 
Crystal Sys., LLC. v. Khattak, No. 226-2011-cv-332, 2012 N.H. Super. LEXIS 4 
(March 30, 2012) (unpublished). 
193 See Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 175864, at *9–12 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2017) (vague and evasive response 
found insufficiently detailed); Vesta Corp. v. Amdocs Mgmt., Ltd., 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45741, at *18 (D. Or. Apr. 1, 2016) (finding numerous aspects of 
Plaintiff’s interrogatory response deficient; concluding that “[e]ach item in the list 
[of trade secret claims] should contain a specific reference to concrete documents 
and should not contain general references to categories of information”); Switch 
Commc’ns. Grp. v. Ballard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85148, at *10–18 (D. Nev. 
June 19, 2012) (holding that trade secret plaintiff was required to identify its trade 
secret claims with reasonable particularity in response to initial contention 
interrogatory, and finding that plaintiff failed to do so) (cataloguing numerous 
cases); Hill v. Best Med. Int’l, Inc., 2010 WL 2546023, at *1–3 & n.4 (W.D. Pa. 
June 24, 2010) (requiring more detailed interrogatory response where the 
plaintiff’s description identified at least one trade secret claim, but primarily 
consisted of “general allegations and generic references to products” ); StonCor 
Grp., Inc. v. Campton, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24926, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. 2006) 
(requiring trade secret plaintiff to answer contention interrogatory with more 
specificity, where plaintiff only “referenced its complaint and then listed generic 
technical categories such as ‘installer list/network,’ ‘pricing strategy and policies,’ 
and ‘customer lists’”).   
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compilation, or combination, of trade secret claims as a means to 
prevent the regulatory disclosure of narrower items of information. 
 
In general, a combination trade secret can be an uncontroversial 
concept:  that individual items, each of which may not be a trade 
secret on its own, can nonetheless be combined in a novel manner 
in order to form a single, unified process that itself constitutes a trade 
secret.  But in such intellectual property, the trade secret right lies in 
the interrelated unit as a whole. Owning a protectable combination 
trade secret does not render individual items within it as trade secrets 
as well; each such item is only a trade secret if it so qualifies, on its 
own. 
In some instances, trade secret claimants employ artificial 
combinations to prevent a showing that individual items do not 
constitute trade secrets.194  To prevent such tactics by PBMs, courts 
should focus on the narrow and precise pricing items to be disclosed.  
Companies which protest that disclosing discrete pricing 
information requires the disclosure of broader combination-sets 
should be required to disaggregate such claims in order to focus 
courts on what is really at issue. 
 
  
 
194 See Sit-Up Ltd. v. IAC/Interactive Corp., No. 05.CIV.9292, 2008 WL 463884, 
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008) (rejecting claimed combination secret where 
plaintiff had arbitrarily thrown together individual aspects of its business methods 
into a false combination claim to try to avoid summary judgment on the individual 
items); Lawfinders Assocs., Inc. v. Legal Research Ctr., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 414, 
423 (N.D. Tex. 1999), aff’d, 193 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 1999) (rejecting claimed 
combination secret in marketing service for attorneys because, among other 
things, “[e]ach of the purported trade secrets stands on its own, that is, each 
purported trade secret does not necessarily rely on another purported trade secret 
to be useful.”); American Airlines, Inc. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Inc., 114 
F.3d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1997) (where a trade secret plaintiff sought to avoid the 
defendant’s summary judgment motion by having its expert witness alter an 
asserted combination trade secret claim by omitting some of its elements —and 
thus making the altered claim better resemble the defendant’s own information—
the court rejected that attempt, in part because the defendant had never received 
the elements comprising the plaintiff’s more expansive, original claim). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It would be ironic if the very thing regulators seek to combat—
artificially high pharmaceutical pricing abetted by opaque deals 
between PBMs and manufacturers—could itself be claimed as a 
form of intellectual property, immune from regulatory disclosure.  
Healthy skepticism about such IP claims is in order when the motive 
behind the claim is to avoid regulation and transparency in the strong 
public interest.  The special context of pricing in PBM agreements 
is not a viable candidate for trade secrecy, and even if it were, such 
thin trade secrecy contentions should not be a shield against 
regulatory disclosure.  
